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Abstract. We consider a game-theoretic setting of contention in communication networks. In
a contention game each of n ≥ 2 identical players has a single information packet that she wants
to transmit using one of k ≥ 1 multiple-access channels. A player uses a slotted-time protocol
that prescribes the probabilities with which at a given time-step she will attempt transmission
at each channel. If more than one players try to transmit over the same channel (collision)
then no transmission happens on that channel. Each player tries to minimize her own expected
latency, i.e. her expected time until successful transmission, by choosing her protocol.
The natural problem that arises in such a setting is, given n and k, to provide the players with
a common, anonymous protocol (if it exists) such that no one would unilaterally deviate from
it (equilibrium protocol). All previous results about strategic contention resolution examine
only the case of a single channel and show that the equilibrium protocols depend on the
feedback that the communication system gives to the players. Here we present multi-channel
equilibrium protocols in two main feedback classes, namely acknowledgement-based and ternary.
In particular, we extend the model and results of the single-channel case studied in [7,10] by
providing equilibria characterizations for more than one channels, and giving specific anonymous,
equilibrium protocols with finite and infinite expected latency. For our equilibrium protocols
with infinite expected latency, all players, with high probability transmit successfully in optimal
time, i.e. Θ(n/k).
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1 Introduction and Motivation
The need for multiple channels in communications has become clear in today’s technologies.
Robustness and high throughput are two main goals that multiple-channels communication
systems try to achieve, since dependence from a small group of nodes in a network as well
as collision of packets that are transmitted on the same node are the issues from which
single-channel broadcast communications suffer. Many works in the Electrical and Electronics
Engineering community have so far considered multi-channel medium access control (MAC)
protocols (e.g. [6,17,21–23,26]) which resolve contention in systems that can either provide
feedback or not. However, to the authors’ knowledge, strategic behaviour in such multi-channel
systems is limited to the Aloha protocol ([16]), contrary to the case of single-channel systems
(e.g. [2,7–10]). In this paper, we examine the problem of strategic contention resolution in
multi-channel systems, where obedience to a suggested protocol is not required. We seek
only anonymous, equilibrium protocols, that is, protocols which do not use player IDs. If a
players’ protocol depended on her ID, then equilibria are simple, but can be unfair as well;
scheduling each player’s transmission through a priority queue according to her ID is an
equilibrium.
We provide two types of equilibrium protocols. The first type, called FIN-EQ, describes
an anonymous, equilibrium protocol that yields finite expected time of successful transmission
(latency) to a player. Similarly, the second type, called IN-EQ, describes an anonymous,
equilibrium protocol which yields infinite expected latency to a player but is also efficient,
that is, all players transmit successfully within Θ( #players#channels) time with high probability. We
study equilibria for two classes of feedback protocols: (a) acknowledgement-based protocols,
where the user gets just the information of whether she had a successful transmission or not,
only when she tries to transmit her packet, and (b) protocols with ternary feedback, where
the user is informed about the number of pending players in each time-step regardless of
whether she attempted transmission or not. Previous results on these classes of protocols
have been produced only for the case of a single transmission channel ([7,10]). Here, we
investigate the multiple-channels case.
In the last part of the paper we seek efficient protocols for both feedback classes. Due to
an impossibility result that we show (see Theorem 4.A, Section 3 in Appendix), the technique
used in [10] by Fiat et al. for the single-channel setting in order to provide a FIN-EQ that is
also efficient cannot be applied when there are more than one channels. This fact discourages
us from searching for efficient FIN-EQ protocols and, instead, points to the search for efficient
IN-EQ protocols, which indeed we find. One could argue that an anonymous protocol with
infinite expected time until successful transmission, such as the IN-EQ protocols we provide,
does not incentivize a player to participate in such a communication system. To this we
reply that exponential waiting-time for a large amount of players (see protocol in Subsection
4.2) is equivalently bad for a player, since waiting for e.g. e10 msec is like waiting forever in
Real-Time-Communications.
1.1 Our results
Most of the proofs are omitted due to lack of space, and can be found in the full version of
the paper, i.e. the Appendix3.
3 Note that the numbering of lemmata, theorems, corollaries and references are the same in this version and
the Appendix, but the numbering of equations is not. Also, in the Appendix there are some additional
lemmata and facts (which do not affect the enumeration of the rest) that contribute to the proofs of the
main results.
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The main contributions of this work are the characterizations of FIN-EQ and IN-EQ
protocols in the two aforementioned feedback classes. Note that in the current bibliog-
raphy regarding the single-channel setting, there are no characterizations of equilibria in
acknowledgement-based protocols. Also, in the single-channel setting the existence of a
symmetric equilibrium with finite expected latency in the class of acknowledgement-based
protocols remains an open problem, even for three players. However, for the settings with 2
and 3 transmission channels, we manage to present simple anonymous FIN-EQ protocols for
up to 4 and 5 players respectively. Note that these protocols are memoryless, while the only
known FIN-EQ protocol in the single-channel setting ([7]) is not.
The paper is organized in three main parts. Section 3 deals with FIN-EQ protocols in
the acknowledgement-based feedback setting. In that section we give two characterizations
of equilibria and also provide FIN-EQ protocols for specific numbers of players and channels.
Section 4 deals with FIN-EQ protocols in the ternary feedback setting and extends the
corresponding results for the single-channel setting by Fiat et al. [10]. Finally, in Section 5,
IN-EQ protocols with deadline are provided with the property that the time until all n players
transmit successfully is Θ(n/k) with high probability, when there are k channels. The latter
result makes clear the advantage (with respect to time efficiency) that multiple channels bring
to a system with strategic users, which is that the time until all players transmit successfully
with high probability is inversely proportional to the number of available channels.
1.2 Related work
Contention in telecommunications is a major problem that results to poor throughput due to
packet collisions. Motivated mainly by this problem, many works studying conflict-resolution
protocols emerged in the late 70’s ([4,5,13,20,25]). Their approach is to resolve a collision
when it occurs, and only then allow further transmissions on the channel. In those works
the user’s packets are assumed either to be generated by some stochastic process, or to
appear at the same time in a worst-case scenario. Here, we consider the latter setting, i.e.
a worst-case model of slotted time, where at any time-step all users have a packet ready
to be transmitted (for an example of a similar bursty-input case, see [3]). As stated in [11],
even though real implementations of multiple-access channels do not fit precisely within the
slotted-time model, it can be shown (e.g. [12,14]) that results obtained in this model do
apply to realistic multiple-access channels.
Also, many works have examined multiple-channel communication protocols. In the data
link layer, a Medium Access Control (MAC) protocol is responsible for the flow of data
through a multiple-access medium. Our multiple-channels model is motivated by theoretical
and experimental results which have shown that higher throughput and lower delay is
achieved by using “multi-channel” MAC protocols (see [17,18,22,23]). In [23],the multi-
channel hidden terminal problem is raised which, additionally to increased packet collisions,
results to incapability of the users to “sense” more than one channels at a time (possibly
none); therefore a user might not know whether another user transmitted successfully or
not (see also [24] for the classical “hidden terminal problem”). This motivates us for the
consideration of feedback protocols with minimum feedback, i.e. “acknowledgement-based”
protocols (see par.2, Section 1). Also, settings with stronger feedback have been studied (e.g.
the Aloha protocol in [16]) in which a user is informed about the number of users that have
not transmitted successfully yet. This is why we consider “ternary feedback” protocols (see
par.2, Section 1).
4 G. Christodoulou, T. Melissourgos, and P. G. Spirakis
Apart from the latter, all of the aforementioned works assume that the users blindly
follow the given protocol, i.e. the users are not strategic. Contention resolution with strategic
users has been studied only in single-channel settings or in the special case of the multiple-
channel Aloha protocol. Some interesting cooperative and noncooperative models of slotted
Aloha have been analysed in [1,15,16]. Aiming to understand the properties of contention
resolution under selfishness, apart from various feedback settings, many cost functions have
also been studied. One of the most meaningful cost functions is the one that models non-zero
transmission costs as in [9] (and also [2,16]).
The theoretical works that relate the most to the current paper are the seminal paper by
Fiat, Mansour and Nadav [10] and two by Christodoulou et al. [7,8] which study protocols
for strategic contention resolution with zero transmission costs. These works examine the
case of a single transmission channel only. In [10] the feedback is ternary. In that work, a
characterization of symmetric equilibria is provided, along with an efficient FIN-EQ protocol
that puts an extremely costly equilibrium after a deadline in order to force users to be
obedient. The feedback model of [7] and [8] is the acknowledgement-based. Among other
results, [7] provides the unique FIN-EQ protocol for the case of two players and a deadline
IN-EQ protocol for at least three players.
2 The Model and Definitions
Game structure. We define a contention game as follows. Let N = {1, 2, . . . , n} be the set
of players, also denoted by [n], and K = {1, 2, . . . , k} the set of channels. Each player has
a single packet that she wants to send through a channel in K, without caring about the
identity of the channel. All players know n and K. We assume synchronous communications
with discretized time, i.e. time slots t = 1, 2, . . . . The players that have not yet successfully
transmitted their packet are called pending and initially all n players are pending. At any
given time slot t, a pending player i has a set A = {0, 1, 2, . . . , k} of pure strategies: a pure
strategy a ∈ A is the action of choosing channel a ∈ K to transmit her packet on, or no
transmission (a = 0). At time t, a (mixed) strategy of a player i is a probability distribution
over A that potentially depends on information that i has gained from the process based on
previous transmission attempts. If exactly one player transmits on a channel in a given slot t,
then her transmission is successful, the successful player exits the game (i.e. she is no longer
pending), and the game continues with the rest of the players. On the other hand, whenever
two or more players try to access the same channel (i.e. transmit) at the same time slot, a
collision occurs and their transmissions fail, in which case the players remain in the game.
The game continues until all players have successfully transmitted their packets.
Transmission protocols. Let Xi,t ∈ A be the channel-indicator variable that keeps track of
the identity of the channel where player i attempted transmission at time t; value 0 indicates
no transmission attempt. For any t ≥ 1, we denote by #»Xt the transmission vector at time t,
i.e.
#»
Xt = (X1,t, X2,t, . . . , Xn,t).
An acknowledgement-based protocol uses very limited channel feedback. After each time
step t, only players that attempted a transmission receive feedback, and the rest get no
information. In fact, the information received by a player i who transmitted during t is
whether her transmission was successful (in which case she gets an acknowledgement and
exits the game) or whether there was a collision.
In a protocol with ternary feedback every pending player in every round is informed about
the number of remaining players m ≤ n. This information is given to the players regardless
of their transmission history.
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Let
#»
h i,t be the vector of the personal transmission history of player i up to time t, i.e.
#»
h i,t = (Xi,1, Xi,2, . . . , Xi,t). We also denote by
#»
h t the transmission history of all players up
to time t, i.e.
#»
h t = (
#»
h 1,t,
#»
h 2,t, . . .
#»
hn,t). A decision rule fi,t for a pending player i at time t,
is a function that maps
#»
h i,t−1 to a strategy
#»
P i,t, with elements Pr(Xi,t = a| #»h i,t−1) for all
a ∈ A. When the transmission probability on some a′ ∈ A is not stated in a decision rule it
is because it can be deduced from the stated ones.
For a player i ∈ N , a (transmission) protocol fi is a sequence of decision rules fi =
{fi,t}t≥1 = fi,1, fi,2, . . . . Given a protocol fi for player i, when her decision rules depend on
the number of pending players and the personal history of i, then we describe them by the
player’s probability distribution on the action set A. In this case, we denote by pi,am,t the
probability of player i choosing action a at time t given her personal history ht−1 when m
players are pending right before t. When the context is clear enough we will drop some of
the indices accordingly.
When we state that the players use an anonymous protocol f , we will mean that they
follow a common protocol f(= f1 = · · · = fn) whose decision rules do not depend on any
ID of the player (in our setting players do not have IDs), i.e. the decision rule assigns the
same strategy to all players with the same personal history. In particular, for any two players
i 6= j and any t ≥ 0, if #»h i,t−1 = #»h j,t−1, it holds that fi,t( #»h i,t−1) = fj,t( #»h j,t−1). In this case,
we drop the subscript i in the notation and write f instead of fi.
A protocol fi for player i is a deadline protocol with deadline t0 if and only if there
exists a finite t0 ≥ 1 such that a particular channel ai ∈ K is assigned (deterministically or
randomly) to player i at some time t ≤ t0 and Pr(Xi,t = ai| #»h i,t−1) = 1 for every time slot
t ≥ t0 and any history #»h i,t−1.
Efficiency. Assume that all n players follow an anonymous protocol f . We will call f
efficient if and only if all players will have successfully transmitted by time Θ(n/k) with
high probability (i.e. with probability tending to 1, as n→∞).
Individual utility. By protocol profile
#»
f = (f1, f2, . . . , fn) we will call the n-tuple of the players’
protocols. For a given transmission sequence
#»
X1,
#»
X2, . . . , which is consistent with
#»
f , define the
latency or success time of agent i as Ti , inf{t : Xi,t = a,Xj,t 6= a, for some a ∈ K,∀j 6= i}.
That is, Ti is the time at which i successfully transmits. Also, define the finishing time of
#»
f as T , supi{Ti}, i.e., the least time at which all players have successfully transmitted.
Given a transmission history
#»
h t, the n-tuple of protocols
#»
f induces a probability distribution
over sequences of further transmissions. In that case, we write C
#»
f
i (
#»
h t) , E[Ti| #»h t, #»f ] =
E[Ti| #»h i,t, #»f ] for the expected latency of a pending agent i given that her current history is #»h i,t
and from t+ 1 on she follows fi. For anonymous protocols, i.e. when f1 = f2 = · · · = fn = f ,
we will simply write Cfi (
#»
h t) instead. Abusing notation slightly, we will also write C
#»
f
i (
#»
h 0)
for the unconditional expected latency of player i induced by
#»
f . We also define the expected
future latency F
#»
f
i (
#»
h t) , C
#»
f
i (
#»
h t)− t and again, whenever clear from the context, we omit
redundant indices or vectors from the notation.
Equilibria. The objective of every player is to minimize her expected latency. We call a
protocol gi a best response of player i to the partial protocol profile
#»
f −i if for any transmission
history
#»
h t, player i cannot decrease her expected latency by unilaterally deviating from gi
after t. That is, for all time slots t, and for all protocols f ′i for player i, we have
C
(
#»
f −i,gi)
i (
#»
h t) ≤ C(
#»
f −i,f ′i)
i (
#»
h t),
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where (
#»
f −i, gi) (respectively, (
#»
f −i, f ′i)) denotes the protocol profile where every player j 6= i
uses protocol fj and player i uses protocol gi (respectively f
′
i). For an anonymous protocol
f , we denote by (f−i, gi) the profile where player j 6= i uses protocol f and player i uses
protocol gi.
We say that
#»
f = (f1, f2, . . . fn) is an equilibrium if for any transmission history
#»
h t the
players cannot decrease their expected latency by unilaterally deviating after t; that is, for
every player i, fi is a best response to
#»
f −i.
FIN-EQ and IN-EQ protocols. We call an anonymous protocol FIN-EQ if it is an equilibrium
protocol and yields finite expected latency to a player. Similarly, we call an anonymous
protocol IN-EQ if it is an equilibrium protocol, yields infinite expected latency to a player,
and is also efficient.
3 Equilibria for Acknowledgement-based Protocols
3.1 Nash equilibria characterizations
Here we provide characterizations of general equilibria (both symmetric and asymmetric) for
an arbitrary number of transmission channels k ≥ 1 and players n ≥ 2 for acknowledgement-
based protocols.
In an acknowledgement-based protocol, the actions of player i at time t depend only
(a) on her personal history
#»
h i,t−1 and (b) on whether she is pending or not at t. Let
#»
f =
(f1, f2, . . . , fn) be a tuple of acknowledgement-based protocols (not necessarily anonymous) for
the n players. For a (finite) positive integer τ∗, and a given history hi,τ∗ = (ai,1, ai,2, . . . , ai,τ∗),
define for player i the protocol
gi = gi(hi,τ∗) ,
{
(Pr{Xi,t = ai,t} = 1, Pr{Xi,t 6= ai,t} = 0) , for 1 ≤ t ≤ τ∗
fi,t, for t > τ
∗.
We will call a personal history
#»
h i,τ∗ consistent with the protocol profile
#»
f if and only if
there is a non-zero probability that
#»
h i,τ∗ will occur for player i under
#»
f . If and only if hi,τ∗
is consistent with
#»
f we call protocol gi(hi,τ∗) consistent with
#»
f , and when clear from the
context we write gi instead. Also, we denote the set of all gi’s, that is, all gi(hi,t)’s for all
t ≥ 1, which are consistent with #»f by G
#»
f
i . If fi = f ∀i (i.e. f is anonymous), then instead of
gi and G
#»
f
i we write g and Gf respectively.
Lemma 1 (Equilibrium characterization 1). Consider a profile
#»
f = (f1, f2, . . . fn) of
acknowledgement-based protocols and a protocol gi = gi(hi,τ∗) for some τ
∗ ≥ 1. The following
statements are equivalent:
(i)
#»
f is an equilibrium.
(ii) For every player i ∈ [n], if gi ∈ G
#»
f
i then C
(
#»
f −i,gi)
i (
#»
h 0) = min
f ′i
C
(
#»
f −i,f ′i)
i (
#»
h 0) = C
#»
f
i (
#»
h 0).
Corollary 1 (Best response). Consider a profile
#»
f = (f1, f2, . . . fn) of acknowledgement-
based protocols. For a fixed protocol f ′i of player i ∈ [n] and some hi,τ∗ = (ai,1, ai,2, . . . , ai,τ∗)
consistent with (
#»
f −i, f ′i), define the following protocol.
ri = ri(hi,τ∗) ,
{
(Pr{Xi,t = ai,t} = 1, Pr{Xi,t 6= ai,t} = 0) , for 1 ≤ t ≤ τ∗
f ′i,t, , for t > τ
∗.
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If for player i there exists a finite τ∗ ≥ 1 such that C(
#»
f −i,ri(hi,τ∗ ))
i (
#»
h 0) ≥ C(
#»
f −i,fi)
i (
#»
h 0) for
every hi,τ∗, then C
(
#»
f −i,f ′i)
i (
#»
h 0) ≥ C(
#»
f −i,fi)
i (
#»
h 0).
Lemma 2 (Equilibrium characterization 2). Consider a profile
#»
f = (f1, f2, . . . fn) of
acknowledgement-based protocols. The following statements are equivalent:
(i)
#»
f is an equilibrium.
(ii) For every player i ∈ [n]
(a) C
(
#»
f −i,gi)
i (
#»
h 0) = C
(
#»
f −i,ri)
i (
#»
h 0) = C
#»
f
i (
#»
h 0), ∀gi, ri ∈ G
#»
f
i , and
(b) C
(
#»
f −i,gi)
i (
#»
h 0) ≤ C(
#»
f −i,ri)
i (
#»
h 0), ∀gi ∈ G
#»
f
i , ri /∈ G
#»
f
i .
3.2 Acknowledgment-based FIN-EQ protocols
Regarding the search for FIN-EQ protocols, there is no straight-forward way for our equi-
librium characterizations (previous subsection) to be used in order to find an equilibrium
protocol. However, they allow us to check whether the protocols discussed in this subsection
are equilibrium protocols. In this subsection we give FIN-EQ protocols for k = 2 and k = 3.
n players - 2 transmission channels. Here, we first give an example of a method
for checking equilibria (Theorem 1). Then, with a better approach, by employing our
characterizations of the previous subsection, we give an acknowledgement-based, equilibrium
protocol for n ∈ {2, 3, 4} players and k = 2 channels (Theorem 3). We define the following
memoryless protocol.
Protocol f : For any player i and every t ≥ 1 and transmission history #»h i,t−1,
fi,t(
#»
h i,t−1) =
(
Pr{Xi,t = 1} = 1
2
, Pr{Xi,t = 2} = 1
2
)
. (1)
Lemma 3. When all n ≥ 2 players use protocol f the expected latency of any player is 2n/n.
In the next theorem we will give an example of a method for checking whether a given
protocol profile is an equilibrium, which however could be inconclusive in some cases. Suppose
you we want to check whether an arbitrary protocol profile
#»
f is an equilibrium. By definition
of the equilibrium, we can fix all protocols except player i’s, i.e.
#»
f −i and check if fi is a best
response to them, and repeat this for every player i. By fixing
#»
f −i we create a stochastic
environment for player i who can be considered to be free to take sequential decisions through
time. These decision correspond to f ′is decision rules. Since, due to the feedback limitations,
i has no information about the number of pending players, this situation from her point of
view is modeled as an infinite state Partially Observable Markov Decision Process (POMDP).
fi is a best response to
#»
f −i if and only if fi is an optimal policy of the POMDP, that is, a
set of decisions through time that minimize her expected latency.
However for this kind of POMDPs there are no known techniques to find an optimal policy.
In order to circumvent this problem, we can assume that player i is an advantageous player
that always knows how many players are pending. This turns the infinite state POMDP into a
finite state Markov Decision Process (MDP), whose optimal policy we can find through known
techniques (e.g. [19]). One can see that the optimal policy in the MDP of the advantageous
player i yields at most the expected latency of the optimal policy in the POMDP of the
initial player i. Thus, if the best policy in the MDP yields the same expected latency as
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what
#»
f gives to i, then we know that fi is a best response; however, if the best policy of
the MDP yields smaller expected latency, then we cannot know if fi is a best response in
the POMDP. The proof of the next theorem (see Appendix) demonstrates the method and
shows that protocol f of (1) is an equilibrium protocol for 3 players.
Theorem 1. For 3 players and 2 channels, f is an equilibrium protocol with expected latency
8/3.
We subsequently exploit the lack of memory and the anonymity of our protocol f
defined in equation (1) and show more general results on equilibria (Theorem 3), using the
characterizations from Subsection 3.1.
Theorem 2. In a contention game with k = 2 channels, consider an anonymous, memoryless
protocol of player i with the property: Pr{Xi,t = 0} = 0, for every t ≥ 1. For more than 4
players any such protocol is not an equilibrium protocol.
Since protocol f belongs to the class of protocols defined in the statement of Theorem 2,
the following corollary is immediate.
Corollary 2. For n ≥ 5 players and k = 2 channels, f is not an equilibrium protocol.
Theorem 3. For n ∈ {2, 3, 4} players and k = 2 channels, f is an equilibrium protocol with
expected latencies 2, 8/3 and 4, respectively.
The proof of Theorem 3 requires some technical lemmata (see Lemma 3.A and Lemma
3.B of Appendix) which are not presented here due to lack of space.
n players - 3 transmission channels. Here, by employing our characterizations of
the previous subsection, we give an acknowledgement-based, equilibrium protocol for n ∈
{2, 3, 4, 5} players and k = 3 channels.
We define the following memoryless protocol f : for any player i, every t ≥ 1 and
transmission history
#»
h i,t−1,
fi,t(
#»
h i,t−1) =
(
Pr{Xi,t = 1} = 1
3
, Pr{Xi,t = 2} = 1
3
, Pr{Xi,t = 3} = 1
3
)
. (2)
Theorem 4. For n ∈ {2, 3, 4, 5} players and k = 3 channels, f defined in (2) is an equilib-
rium protocol with expected latencies 3/2, 15/8, 189/80 and 597/200, respectively.
4 Equilibria for Ternary Feedback Protocols
In this section we consider anonymous protocols with ternary feedback, that is, a pending
player knows at every time t the number m ≤ n of pending players. This knowledge is given
to each player regardless of her transmission history.
4.1 Nash equilibria characterization
Here we give a characterization of FIN-EQ protocols for n ≥ 1 players and k = 2 channels in
the general history-dependent case for ternary feedback. (For details on the characterization,
see Appendix.)
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Theorem 5. There exists an anonymous, history-dependent, equilibrium protocol with
ternary feedback for n players and 2 transmission channels.
The equilibrium probability that defines the equilibrium protocol, although guaranteed
to exist when expected (future) latencies are finite, is difficult to be expressed in closed form.
For more comments, see Appendix.
4.2 History-independent FIN-EQ protocols
Let us now consider anonymous, history-independent protocols, that is, protocols whose
decision rules depend only on the number 1 ≤ m ≤ n of pending players. Now, the decision
rule pm of the players does not depend on their transmission history (and therefore on time
as well), hence a player’s expected future latency Fm does not depend on her transmission
history. In this class of protocols the following theorem fully characterizes the equilibria.
Theorem 6. There exists a unique, anonymous, history-independent, equilibrium protocol
with ternary feedback for n players and 2 transmission channels, which is: any player among
2 ≤ m ≤ n remaining players, for every t ≥ 1 attempts transmission to each channel with
equal probability pm. This probability is Θ(
1√
m
) and yields expected future latency eΘ(
√
m) for
every player.
The latter result is analogous to the one in [10] that characterizes anonymous, history-
independent, equilibrium protocols with ternary feedback for the case of a single channel.
However here, the proof methodology is different due to the fact that the transmission
probabilities in equilibrium cannot be expressed in closed-form, therefore their asymptotic
behaviour can only be extracted from a recurrence relation, which, contrary to the one in [10],
is quite complex. Using dynamic programming, we compute the equilibrium probabilities for
up to m = 100 which are presented in Figure 1 of the Appendix.
5 IN-EQ Protocols for Both Feedback Classes
In this section we give IN-EQ protocols within the classes of acknowledgement-based and
ternary feedback for the general case of k ≥ 1 channels and any number of n ≥ 2k+ 1 players.
For this, we employ the deadline idea introduced in [10] and consequently used in [7,8]. Our
protocols have the property that the time until all players transmit successfully is Θ(n/k)
with high probability, even though the expected time until all players transmit successfully
is infinite.
5.1 Acknowledgemnt-based feedback
An efficient deadline protocol with channel assignment at t = Θ(n/k). Consider
k ≥ 1 transmission channels, n ≥ 2k+ 1 players, a fixed constant β ∈ (0, 1) and a deadline t0
to be determined consequently. The t0 − 1 time steps are partitioned into r + 1 consecutive
intervals I1, I2, . . . , Ir+1 where r is the unique integer in
[− logβ n/2− 1,− logβ n/2]. For
any j ∈ {1, 2, . . . , r + 1} define nj = βjn/k. For j ∈ {1, 2, . . . , r} the length of interval Ij
is lj = b eβnjc. Interval Ir+1 is special and has length lr+1 = n/k. We define the following
anonymous protocol.
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Protocol g1:
Every player among 1 ≤ m ≤ n pending players for t ∈ Ij assigns transmission
probability 1/max{nj , k} to each channel. Right before the deadline
t0 = 1 +
∑r+1
j=1 lj each pending player is assigned to a random channel equiprobably,
and for t ≥ t0 always attempts transmission to that channel.
Lemma 4. Protocol g1 for n ≥ 2k+ 1 players and k ≥ 1 channels, is an equilibrium protocol
and it is also efficient.
5.2 Ternary feedback
Since in the ternary feedback setting the only history-independent equilibrium from Subsection
4.2 yields exponential expected latency in the number of players n, even one player’s latency
being any polynomial in n happens with exponentially small probability. This fact points
to history-dependent protocols as candidates for efficient equilibria. Here, we construct a
protocol (Theorem 7) which imposes a heavy cost on any player that does not manage to
transmit successfully until a certain deadline-round. This forces any potential deviator to
play “fairly” until the deadline and follow an anonymous, socially optimal protocol, named
SOP (guarantees expected time Θ(n/k) for all players to pass). To prove the main theorem
of this subsection we need a series of technical results, namely the following three lemmata
5, 6, and 7. Lemma 6 shows that protocol SOP is socially optimal and its proof employs
Lemma 5.A which can be found in the Appendix. All the omitted proofs can also be found
in the Appendix.
Lemma 5. Consider a single round with k ≥ 1 channels and n ≥ 1 players. Assume that for
every player the probability of transmission attempt is z ∈ [0, 1] which she splits equally to all
k channels. Then, the expected number4 of players that transmit successfully is zn
(
1− zk
)n−1
.
We define the following anonymous, history-independent protocol which we prove to
be efficient. However, we remark that it is not in equilibrium, due to Theorem 6 which
characterizes the unique, anonymous, equilibrium protocol that is history-independent.
Protocol SOP:
Every player among 1 ≤ m ≤ n pending players, in each round t ≥ 1 assigns
transmission probability 1/max{m, k} to each channel.
Lemma 6. Protocol SOP for k ≥ 1 channels and n > k players has expected finishing time
O((n− k)/k).
In the sequel, by e we denote the constant named “Euler’s number”, i.e. e = 2.7182 . . . .
Using the above lemmata we are able to prove the following.
Lemma 7. (a) If at t = 0 there are n pending players, the probability that more than k
players are pending at time t1 = 2e(n− k)/k is at most exp
(−n−k2ek ).
(b) If at t = 0 there are k pending players, the probability that not all players have transmitted
successfully at time t2 = 2e(n− k)/k is at most exp
(−n−k2ek ).
4 We define 00 = 1.
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Proof. Let {Yt}t1t=1 be random variables which indicate the number of successful transmissions
that occur in each time-step from t = 1 up to t1 , 2e(n−k)/k, given that there are n pending
players at time t = 0. For the events for which Y ,
∑t1
t=1 Yt > n − k we have the desired
outcome. For the rest, since the pending players in each round 1 ≤ t ≤ t1 are m > k, the
protocol prescribes to each player probability 1/m on each channel. Therefore, by Lemma 5,
we have E[Yt] = k (1− 1/m)m−1. In the next claim we show that Yt stochastically dominates
a random variable Zt ∈ {0, 1, . . . , k} that indicates the number of successful transmissions in
round 1 ≤ t ≤ t1 but, in this process, the players that transmit successfully are placed back
to the group of pending players.
Claim. Pr{Yt ≥ x} ≥ Pr{Zt ≥ x}, for all x ∈ {0, 1, · · · , k}.
Proof. We will prove the above claim by showing the stronger fact that, for any fixed number
1 ≤ m ≤ n− 1 of pending players at time t,
Pr{Yt ≥ x | m pending players} ≥ Pr{Yt ≥ x | m+ 1 pending players}, for all x ∈ {0, 1, · · · , k}.
Indeed, by substituting the probabilities of the above inequality we get,(
m
x
)
x!
(
1
m
)x (
1− x
m
)m−x ≥ (m+ 1
x
)
x!
(
1
m+ 1
)x(
1− x
m+ 1
)m+1−x
,
or equivalently, (m+ 1)m(m− x)m−x ≥ mm(m− x+ 1)m−x,
and finally,
(
1 +
1
m
)m
≥
(
1 +
1
m− x
)m−x
,
which is true, since the function f(w) = (1 + 1/w)w is strictly increasing. The claim follows
from the fact that for any fixed x ∈ {0, 1, · · · , k},
Pr{Zt ≥ x} = Pr{Yt ≥ x | n pending players}.
Clearly {Zt}t1t=1 are independent random variables bounded in [0, k]. Let Z ,
∑t1
t=1 Zt and
µ1 , E[Z] =
∑t1
t=1 E[Zt] = t1k (1− 1/n)n−1. Then by a Chernoff bound and the stochastic
domination we have,
Pr(Y ≤ n− k) ≤ Pr(Z ≤ n− k) = Pr
(
Z ≤ µ1
2e (1− 1/n)n−1
)
≤ Pr
(
Z ≤ µ1
2
)
≤ exp
(
−(1− 1/2)
2µ21
t1(k − 0)2
)
≤ exp
(
−1
4
t1
e2
)
= exp
(
−n− k
2ek
)
,
where in the last three inequalities we used the fact that (1− 1/n)n−1 ≥ 1/e.
For the second part of the proof, suppose the process is at round t = 0 with k pending
players. Let {Xt}t2t=1 be random variables which indicate the number of successful transmis-
sions that occur in each time-step from t = 1 up to t2 , 2e(n− k)/k, given that there are
k pending players at time t = 0. The pending players in each round 1 ≤ t ≤ t2 are m ≤ k,
hence the protocol prescribes to each player probability 1/k on each channel. By Lemma 5,
we have E[Xt] = m (1− 1/k)m−1. Now, observe that Xt stochastically dominates a random
variable Wt ∈ {0, 1, . . . , k} that indicates the number of successful transmissions in round
1 ≤ t ≤ t2 but, in this process, the players that transmit successfully are placed back to the
group of pending players. The latter observation is easy to see since an argument similar to
the Claim that was stated earlier holds in this case.
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Clearly, {Wt}t2t=1 are independent random variables bounded in [0, k]. Let W ,
∑t2
t=1Wt
and µ2 , E[W ] =
∑t2
t=1 E[Wt] = t2k (1− 1/k)k−1. Then by a Chernoff bound and the
stochastic domination we have,
Pr(X ≤ k − 1) ≤ Pr(W ≤ k) = Pr
(
W ≤ µ2k
2e(n− k) (1− 1/k)k−1
)
≤ Pr
(
W ≤ µ2
2
)
≤ exp
(
−(1− 1/2)
2µ22
t2(k − 0)2
)
≤ exp
(
−1
4
t2
e2
)
= exp
(
−n− k
2ek
)
,
where in the last three inequalities we used the fact that (1− 1/k)k−1 ≥ 1/e, and n ≥ 2k+ 1.
This completes the proof of the lemma.
We define the following anonymous protocol. In the next theorem we show that it is an
equilibrium protocol and also that it is efficient.
Protocol g2:
Let the deadline be t0 = 4e(n− k)/k. Every player among 1 ≤ m ≤ n pending
players for 1 ≤ t ≤ t0 − 1 assigns transmission probability 1/max{m, k} to each
channel. Right before t0 each pending player is assigned to a random channel
equiprobably, and for t ≥ t0 always attempts transmission to that channel.
Theorem 7. Protocol g2 for n ≥ 2k + 1 players and k ≥ 1 channels is an equilibrium
protocol, and for n ∈ ω(k) it is also efficient.
Proof. First, we show that it is an equilibrium protocol when n ≥ 2k + 1. The expected
latency of a player using the aforementioned protocol g2 is ∞. That is because there is an
event with positive probability in which some player i finds herself in an equilibrium where at
least 2 of the other players have been assigned to each and all of the k channels and transmit
there in every time slot. In particular, with probability at least k( 1n)
t0−1 > 0 all players will
be pending right after t0 − 1. Given this, with probability
(
n−1
2,2,...,2,n−1−2k
)
( 1k )
n−1 > 0 exactly
2 out of n − 1 players will be assigned to each of the k − 1 channels and the remaining
players (including player i), which are at least 3, are assigned to the remaining channel.
Therefore, the aforementioned two events occur with positive probability, and then for player
i all channels are blocked for every t ≥ t0, resulting to infinite latency. Hence, the expected
latency of a player using protocol g2 is ∞.
Now suppose that player i unilaterally deviates to some protocol g′2. The event that
all players are pending right before t0 remains non-empty, since the event that all players
transmit on the same channel as i for every 1 ≤ t ≤ t0 − 1 happens with positive probability.
Given that, the event that at least 2 of the players other than i will be assigned to each
channel happens with positive probability. Therefore, the deviator’s expected latency remains
∞ and g2 is an equilibrium protocol.
Now we will show that, when n ∈ ω(k), this protocol is also efficient, i.e. the time until
all n players transmit successfully is linear in n/k with high probability. By Lemma 7, the
probability that not all players have successfully transmitted by time t1 + t2 = 4e(n− k)/k
is at most exp
(−n−k2ek )+ exp (−n−k2ek ) = 2exp (−n−k2ek ) . Therefore, when n ∈ ω(k), no player
is pending after 4e(n− k)/k rounds with high probability.
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Abstract. We consider a game-theoretic setting of contention in communication networks. In
a contention game each of n ≥ 2 identical players has a single information packet that she wants
to transmit using one of k ≥ 1 multiple-access channels. A player uses a slotted-time protocol
that prescribes the probabilities with which at a given time-step she will attempt transmission
at each channel. If more than one players try to transmit over the same channel (collision)
then no transmission happens on that channel. Each player tries to minimize her own expected
latency, i.e. her expected time until successful transmission, by choosing her protocol.
The natural problem that arises in such a setting is, given n and k, to provide the players with
a common, anonymous protocol (if it exists) such that no one would unilaterally deviate from
it (equilibrium protocol). All previous results about strategic contention resolution examine
only the case of a single channel and show that the equilibrium protocols depend on the
feedback that the communication system gives to the players. Here we present multi-channel
equilibrium protocols in two main feedback classes, namely acknowledgement-based and ternary.
In particular, we extend the model and results of the single-channel case studied in [7,10] by
providing equilibria characterizations for more than one channels, and giving specific anonymous,
equilibrium protocols with finite and infinite expected latency. For our equilibrium protocols
with infinite expected latency, all players, with high probability transmit successfully in optimal
time, i.e. Θ(n/k).
Keywords: Contention resolution, Multiple channels, Acknowledgement-based protocol, Ternary
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1 Introduction and Motivation
The need for multiple channels in communications has become clear in today’s technologies.
Robustness and high throughput are two main goals that multiple-channels communication
systems try to achieve, since dependence from a small group of nodes in a network as well
as collision of packets that are transmitted on the same node are the issues from which
single-channel broadcast communications suffer. Many works in the Electrical and Electronics
Engineering community have so far considered multi-channel medium access control (MAC)
protocols (e.g. [6,17,21–23,26]) which resolve contention in systems that can either provide
feedback or not. However, to the authors’ knowledge, strategic behaviour in such multi-channel
systems is limited to the Aloha protocol ([16]), contrary to the case of single-channel systems
(e.g. [2,7–10]). In this paper, we examine the problem of strategic contention resolution in
multi-channel systems, where obedience to a suggested protocol is not required. We seek
only anonymous, equilibrium protocols, that is, protocols which do not use player IDs. If a
players’ protocol depended on her ID, then equilibria are simple, but can be unfair as well;
scheduling each player’s transmission through a priority queue according to her ID is an
equilibrium.
We provide two types of equilibrium protocols. The first type, called FIN-EQ, describes
an anonymous, equilibrium protocol that yields finite expected time of successful transmission
(latency) to a player. Similarly, the second type, called IN-EQ, describes an anonymous,
equilibrium protocol which yields infinite expected latency to a player but is also efficient,
that is, all players transmit successfully within Θ( #players#channels) time with high probability. We
study equilibria for two classes of feedback protocols: (a) acknowledgement-based protocols,
where the user gets just the information of whether she had a successful transmission or not,
only when she tries to transmit her packet, and (b) protocols with ternary feedback, where
the user is informed about the number of pending players in each time-step regardless of
whether she attempted transmission or not. Previous results on these classes of protocols
have been produced only for the case of a single transmission channel ([7,10]). Here, we
investigate the multiple-channels case.
In the last part of the paper we seek efficient protocols for both feedback classes. Due to
an impossibility result that we show (see Theorem 4.A, Section 3 in Appendix), the technique
used in [10] by Fiat et al. for the single-channel setting in order to provide a FIN-EQ that is
also efficient cannot be applied when there are more than one channels. This fact discourages
us from searching for efficient FIN-EQ protocols and, instead, points to the search for efficient
IN-EQ protocols, which indeed we find. One could argue that an anonymous protocol with
infinite expected time until successful transmission, such as the IN-EQ protocols we provide,
does not incentivize a player to participate in such a communication system. To this we
reply that exponential waiting-time for a large amount of players (see protocol in Subsection
4.2) is equivalently bad for a player, since waiting for e.g. e10 msec is like waiting forever in
Real-Time-Communications.
1.1 Our results
The main contributions of this work are the characterizations of FIN-EQ and IN-EQ protocols
in the two aforementioned feedback classes. Note that in the current bibliography regarding
the single-channel setting, there are no characterizations of equilibria in acknowledgement-
based protocols. Also, in the single-channel setting the existence of a symmetric equilibrium
with finite expected latency in the class of acknowledgement-based protocols remains an
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open problem, even for three players. However, for the settings with 2 and 3 transmission
channels, we manage to present simple FIN-EQ protocols for up to 4 and 5 players respectively.
Note that these protocols are memoryless, while the only known FIN-EQ protocol in the
single-channel setting ([7]) is not.
The paper is organized in three main parts. Section 3 deals with FIN-EQ protocols in
the acknowledgement-based feedback setting, Section 4 deals with FIN-EQ protocols in the
ternary feedback setting, and in Section 5, IN-EQ protocols with deadline are provided.
Particularly, in Subsection 3.1 we provide characterizations of general equilibria (both
symmetric and asymmetric) for an arbitrary number of transmission channels and players for
acknowledgement-based protocols. Then in Subsection 3.2, by employing our characterizations,
we find anonymous, equilibrium protocols for the case of 2 transmission channels with 2, 3
and 4 players and for the case of 3 transmission channels with 2, 3, 4 and 5 players.
In Subsection 4.1, we also give a characterization of FIN-EQ protocols for n ≥ 1 players
and k = 2 channels in the general history-dependent case for ternary feedback. From the
latter characterization, in Subsection 4.2 we prove that in the class of history-independent
protocols there is a unique history-independent equilibrium protocol that prescribes to each
player transmission probability Θ(1/
√
m) to each channel when the pending players are
m ≤ n and yields for the player expected time to successful transmission exp(Θ(√n)). The
results presented in this paragraph extend the corresponding results for the single-channel
setting by Fiat et al. [10].
Finally, in Subsections 5.1 and 5.2 we give IN-EQ protocols within the classes of
acknowledgement-based and ternary feedback, respectively, for the general case of k ≥ 1
channels and any number of n ≥ 2k + 1 players. For this, we employ the deadline idea
introduced in [10] and consequently used in [7,8]. Our protocols have the property that the
time until all players transmit successfully is Θ(n/k) with high probability, even though the
expected time until all players transmit successfully is infinite. The latter results, make clear
the advantage (with respect to time efficiency) that multiple channels bring to a system
with strategic users, which is that the time until all players transmit successfully with high
probability is inversely proportional to the number of available channels.
1.2 Related work
Contention in telecommunications is a major problem that results to poor throughput due to
packet collisions. Motivated mainly by this problem, many works studying conflict-resolution
protocols emerged in the late 70’s ([4,5,13,20,25]). Their approach is to resolve a collision
when it occurs, and only then allow further transmissions on the channel. In those works
the user’s packets are assumed either to be generated by some stochastic process, or to
appear at the same time in a worst-case scenario. Here, we consider the latter setting, i.e.
a worst-case model of slotted time, where at any time-step all users have a packet ready
to be transmitted (for an example of a similar bursty-input case, see [3]). As stated in [11],
even though real implementations of multiple-access channels do not fit precisely within the
slotted-time model, it can be shown (e.g. [12,14]) that results obtained in this model do
apply to realistic multiple-access channels.
Also, many works have examined multiple-channel communication protocols. In the data
link layer, a Medium Access Control (MAC) protocol is responsible for the flow of data
through a multiple-access medium. Our multiple-channels model is motivated by theoretical
and experimental results which have shown that higher throughput and lower delay is
achieved by using “multi-channel” MAC protocols (see [17,18,22,23]). In [23],the multi-
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channel hidden terminal problem is raised which, additionally to increased packet collisions,
results to incapability of the users to “sense” more than one channels at a time (possibly
none); therefore a user might not know whether another user transmitted successfully or
not (see also [24] for the classical “hidden terminal problem”). This motivates us for the
consideration of feedback protocols with minimum feedback, i.e. “acknowledgement-based”
protocols (see par.2, Section 1). Also, settings with stronger feedback have been studied (e.g.
the Aloha protocol in [16]) in which a user is informed about the number of users that have
not transmitted successfully yet. This is why we consider “ternary feedback” protocols (see
par.2, Section 1).
Apart from the latter, all of the aforementioned works assume that the users blindly
follow the given protocol, i.e. the users are not strategic. Contention resolution with strategic
users has been studied only in single-channel settings or in the special case of the multiple-
channel Aloha protocol. Some interesting cooperative and noncooperative models of slotted
Aloha have been analysed in [1,15,16]. Aiming to understand the properties of contention
resolution under selfishness, apart from various feedback settings, many cost functions have
also been studied. One of the most meaningful cost functions is the one that models non-zero
transmission costs as in [9] (and also [2,16]).
The theoretical works that relate the most to the current paper are the seminal paper by
Fiat, Mansour and Nadav [10] and two by Christodoulou et al. [7,8] which study protocols
for strategic contention resolution with zero transmission costs. These works examine the
case of a single transmission channel only. In [10] the feedback is ternary. In that work, a
characterization of symmetric equilibria is provided, along with an efficient FIN-EQ protocol
that puts an extremely costly equilibrium after a deadline in order to force users to be
obedient. The feedback model of [7] and [8] is the acknowledgement-based. Among other
results, [7] provides the unique FIN-EQ protocol for the case of two players and a deadline
IN-EQ protocol for at least three players.
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2 The Model and Definitions
Game structure. We define a contention game as follows. Let N = {1, 2, . . . , n} be the set
of players, also denoted by [n], and K = {1, 2, . . . , k} the set of channels. Each player has
a single packet that she wants to send through a channel in K, without caring about the
identity of the channel. All players know n and K. We assume synchronous communications
with discretized time, i.e. time slots t = 1, 2, . . . . The players that have not yet successfully
transmitted their packet are called pending and initially all n players are pending. At any
given time slot t, a pending player i has a set A = {0, 1, 2, . . . , k} of pure strategies: a pure
strategy a ∈ A is the action of choosing channel a ∈ K to transmit her packet on, or no
transmission (a = 0). At time t, a (mixed) strategy of a player i is a probability distribution
over A that potentially depends on information that i has gained from the process based on
previous transmission attempts. If exactly one player transmits on a channel in a given slot t,
then her transmission is successful, the successful player exits the game (i.e. she is no longer
pending), and the game continues with the rest of the players. On the other hand, whenever
two or more players try to access the same channel (i.e. transmit) at the same time slot, a
collision occurs and their transmissions fail, in which case the players remain in the game.
The game continues until all players have successfully transmitted their packets.
Transmission protocols. Let Xi,t ∈ A be the channel-indicator variable that keeps track of
the identity of the channel where player i attempted transmission at time t; value 0 indicates
no transmission attempt. For any t ≥ 1, we denote by #»Xt the transmission vector at time t,
i.e.
#»
Xt = (X1,t, X2,t, . . . , Xn,t).
An acknowledgement-based protocol uses very limited channel feedback. After each time
step t, only players that attempted a transmission receive feedback, and the rest get no
information. In fact, the information received by a player i who transmitted during t is
whether her transmission was successful (in which case she gets an acknowledgement and
exits the game) or whether there was a collision.
In a protocol with ternary feedback every pending player in every round is informed about
the number of remaining players m ≤ n. This information is given to the players regardless
of their transmission history.
Let
#»
h i,t be the vector of the personal transmission history of player i up to time t, i.e.
#»
h i,t = (Xi,1, Xi,2, . . . , Xi,t). We also denote by
#»
h t the transmission history of all players up
to time t, i.e.
#»
h t = (
#»
h 1,t,
#»
h 2,t, . . .
#»
hn,t). A decision rule fi,t for a pending player i at time t,
is a function that maps
#»
h i,t−1 to a strategy
#»
P i,t, with elements Pr(Xi,t = a| #»h i,t−1) for all
a ∈ A. When the transmission probability on some a′ ∈ A is not stated in a decision rule it
is because it can be deduced from the stated ones.
For a player i ∈ N , a (transmission) protocol fi is a sequence of decision rules fi =
{fi,t}t≥1 = fi,1, fi,2, . . . . Given a protocol fi for player i, when her decision rules depend on
the number of pending players and the personal history of i, then we describe them by the
player’s probability distribution on the action set A. In this case, we denote by pi,am,t the
probability of player i choosing action a at time t given her personal history ht−1 when m
players are pending right before t. When the context is clear enough we will drop some of
the indices accordingly.
When we state that the players use an anonymous protocol f , we will mean that they
follow a common protocol f(= f1 = · · · = fn) whose decision rules do not depend on any
ID of the player (in our setting players do not have IDs), i.e. the decision rule assigns the
same strategy to all players with the same personal history. In particular, for any two players
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i 6= j and any t ≥ 0, if #»h i,t−1 = #»h j,t−1, it holds that fi,t( #»h i,t−1) = fj,t( #»h j,t−1). In this case,
we drop the subscript i in the notation and write f instead of fi.
A protocol fi for player i is a deadline protocol with deadline t0 if and only if there
exists a finite t0 ≥ 1 such that a particular channel ai ∈ K is assigned (deterministically or
randomly) to player i at some time t ≤ t0 and Pr(Xi,t = ai| #»h i,t−1) = 1 for every time slot
t ≥ t0 and any history #»h i,t−1.
Efficiency. Assume that all n players follow an anonymous protocol f . We will call f
efficient if and only if all players will have successfully transmitted by time Θ(n/k) with
high probability (i.e. with probability tending to 1, as n→∞).
Individual utility. By protocol profile
#»
f = (f1, f2, . . . , fn) we will call the n-tuple of the players’
protocols. For a given transmission sequence
#»
X1,
#»
X2, . . . , which is consistent with
#»
f , define the
latency or success time of agent i as Ti , inf{t : Xi,t = a,Xj,t 6= a, for some a ∈ K,∀j 6= i}.
That is, Ti is the time at which i successfully transmits. Also, define the finishing time of
#»
f as T , supi{Ti}, i.e., the least time at which all players have successfully transmitted.
Given a transmission history
#»
h t, the n-tuple of protocols
#»
f induces a probability distribution
over sequences of further transmissions. In that case, we write C
#»
f
i (
#»
h t) , E[Ti| #»h t, #»f ] =
E[Ti| #»h i,t, #»f ] for the expected latency of a pending agent i given that her current history is #»h i,t
and from t+ 1 on she follows fi. For anonymous protocols, i.e. when f1 = f2 = · · · = fn = f ,
we will simply write Cfi (
#»
h t) instead. Abusing notation slightly, we will also write C
#»
f
i (
#»
h 0)
for the unconditional expected latency of player i induced by
#»
f . We also define the expected
future latency F
#»
f
i (
#»
h t) , C
#»
f
i (
#»
h t)− t and again, whenever clear from the context, we omit
redundant indices or vectors from the notation.
Equilibria. The objective of every player is to minimize her expected latency. We call a
protocol gi a best response of player i to the partial protocol profile
#»
f −i if for any transmission
history
#»
h t, player i cannot decrease her expected latency by unilaterally deviating from gi
after t. That is, for all time slots t, and for all protocols f ′i for player i, we have
C
(
#»
f −i,gi)
i (
#»
h t) ≤ C(
#»
f −i,f ′i)
i (
#»
h t),
where (
#»
f −i, gi) (respectively, (
#»
f −i, f ′i)) denotes the protocol profile where every player j 6= i
uses protocol fj and player i uses protocol gi (respectively f
′
i). For an anonymous protocol
f , we denote by (f−i, gi) the profile where player j 6= i uses protocol f and player i uses
protocol gi.
We say that
#»
f = (f1, f2, . . . fn) is an equilibrium if for any transmission history
#»
h t the
players cannot decrease their expected latency by unilaterally deviating after t; that is, for
every player i, fi is a best response to
#»
f −i.
FIN-EQ and IN-EQ protocols. We call an anonymous protocol FIN-EQ if it is an equilibrium
protocol and yields finite expected latency to a player. Similarly, we call an anonymous
protocol IN-EQ if it is an equilibrium protocol, yields infinite expected latency to a player,
and is also efficient.
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3 Equilibria for Acknowledgement-based Protocols
3.1 Nash equilibria characterizations
Here we provide characterizations of general equilibria (both symmetric and asymmetric) for
an arbitrary number of transmission channels k ≥ 1 and players n ≥ 2 for acknowledgement-
based protocols.
In an acknowledgement-based protocol, the actions of player i at time t depend only
(a) on her personal history
#»
h i,t−1 and (b) on whether she is pending or not at t. Let
#»
f =
(f1, f2, . . . , fn) be a tuple of acknowledgement-based protocols (not necessarily anonymous) for
the n players. For a (finite) positive integer τ∗, and a given history hi,τ∗ = (ai,1, ai,2, . . . , ai,τ∗),
define for player i the protocol
gi = gi(hi,τ∗) ,
{
(Pr{Xi,t = ai,t} = 1, Pr{Xi,t 6= ai,t} = 0) , for 1 ≤ t ≤ τ∗
fi,t, for t > τ
∗.
(1)
We will call a personal history
#»
h i,τ∗ consistent with the protocol profile
#»
f if and only if
there is a non-zero probability that
#»
h i,τ∗ will occur for player i under
#»
f . If and only if hi,τ∗
is consistent with
#»
f we call protocol gi(hi,τ∗) consistent with
#»
f , and when clear from the
context we write gi instead. Also, we denote the set of all gi’s, that is, all gi(hi,t)’s for all
t ≥ 1, which are consistent with #»f by G
#»
f
i . If fi = f ∀i (i.e. f is anonymous), then instead of
gi and G
#»
f
i we write g and Gf respectively.
Lemma 1 (Equilibrium characterization 1). Consider a profile
#»
f = (f1, f2, . . . fn) of
acknowledgement-based protocols and a protocol gi = gi(hi,τ∗) for some τ
∗ ≥ 1. The following
statements are equivalent:
(i)
#»
f is an equilibrium.
(ii) For every player i ∈ [n], if gi ∈ G
#»
f
i then C
(
#»
f −i,gi)
i (
#»
h 0) = min
f ′i
C
(
#»
f −i,f ′i)
i (
#»
h 0) = C
#»
f
i (
#»
h 0).
Proof. To show that
#»
f being an equilibrium is a sufficient condition, we use the same
argument as in Lemma 4 of [7]. In particular, for a player i, due to the Tower Property we
have,
C
#»
f
i (
#»
h 0) = E[Ti| #»h i,0, #»f ]
=
∑
#»
h i,τ∗
E[Ti| #»h i,0, ( #»f −i, gi(hi,τ∗))]Pr{ #»h i,τ∗ happens for i}. (2)
For short, we will denote gi(hi,τ∗) by gi, thus we denote E[Ti| #»h i,0, ( #»f −i, gi(hi,τ∗))] by
C
(
#»
f −i,gi)
i (
#»
h 0). Then, assume for the sake of contradiction that there is a transmission history
#»
h i,τ∗ for player i such that C
(
#»
f −i,gi)
i (
#»
h 0) 6= C
#»
f
i (
#»
h 0). Obviously, if C
(
#»
f −i,gi)
i (
#»
h 0) < C
#»
f
i (
#»
h 0)
this would mean that protocol gi(τ
∗) is better than fi, thus
#»
f is not an equilibrium.
If, on the other hand, C
(
#»
f −i,gi)
i (
#»
h 0) > C
#»
f
i (
#»
h 0), then from (2) there must exist another
transmission history
#»
h ′i,τ∗ such that C
(
#»
f −i,gi(
#»
h ′
i,τ∗ ))
i (
#»
h 0) < C
#»
f
i (
#»
h 0). Therefore, we conclude
that C
#»
f
i (
#»
h 0) = C
(
#»
f −i,gi)
i (
#»
h 0) which also equals min
f ′i
C
(
#»
f −i,f ′i)
i (
#»
h 0) by definition of the
equilibrium, for every transmission history
#»
h i,τ∗ that is consistent with
#»
f .
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To show that
#»
f being an equilibrium is also a necessary condition, assume that gi ∈ G
#»
f
i
implies C
(
#»
f −i,gi)
i (
#»
h 0) = min
f ′i
C
(
#»
f −i,f ′i)
i (
#»
h 0). Then, equality (2) becomes
C
#»
f
i (
#»
h 0) =
∑
#»
h i,τ∗
C
(
#»
f −i,gi(hi,τ∗ ))
i (
#»
h 0)Pr{ #»h i,τ∗ happens for i}
=
∑
#»
h i,τ∗
min
f ′i
C
(
#»
f −i,f ′i)
i (
#»
h 0)Pr{ #»h i,τ∗ happens for i}
= min
f ′i
C
(
#»
f −i,f ′i)
i (
#»
h 0)
and thus
#»
f is by definition an equilibrium.
Corollary 1 (Best response). Consider a profile
#»
f = (f1, f2, . . . fn) of acknowledgement-
based protocols. For a fixed protocol f ′i of player i ∈ [n] and some hi,τ∗ = (ai,1, ai,2, . . . , ai,τ∗)
consistent with (
#»
f −i, f ′i), define the following protocol.
ri = ri(hi,τ∗) ,
{
(Pr{Xi,t = ai,t} = 1, Pr{Xi,t 6= ai,t} = 0) , for 1 ≤ t ≤ τ∗
f ′i,t, , for t > τ
∗.
(3)
If for player i there exists a finite τ∗ ≥ 1 such that C(
#»
f −i,ri(hi,τ∗ ))
i (
#»
h 0) ≥ C(
#»
f −i,fi)
i (
#»
h 0) for
every hi,τ∗, then C
(
#»
f −i,f ′i)
i (
#»
h 0) ≥ C(
#»
f −i,fi)
i (
#»
h 0).
Proof. By definition of the expected latency (equation (2)) for a fixed τ∗ we have:
C
(
#»
f −i,f ′i)
i (
#»
h 0) =
∑
#»
h i,τ∗
C
(
#»
f −i,ri(hi,τ∗ ))
i (
#»
h 0)Pr{ #»h i,τ∗ happens for i}
≥
∑
#»
h i,τ∗
C
(
#»
f −i,fi)
i (
#»
h 0)Pr{ #»h i,τ∗ happens for i}
= C
(
#»
f −i,fi)
i (
#»
h 0).
Lemma 2 (Equilibrium characterization 2). Consider a profile
#»
f = (f1, f2, . . . fn) of
acknowledgement-based protocols. The following statements are equivalent:
(i)
#»
f is an equilibrium.
(ii) For every player i ∈ [n]
(a) C
(
#»
f −i,gi)
i (
#»
h 0) = C
(
#»
f −i,ri)
i (
#»
h 0) = C
#»
f
i (
#»
h 0), ∀gi, ri ∈ G
#»
f
i , and
(b) C
(
#»
f −i,gi)
i (
#»
h 0) ≤ C(
#»
f −i,ri)
i (
#»
h 0), ∀gi ∈ G
#»
f
i , ri /∈ G
#»
f
i .
Proof. Sufficiency of
#»
f being an equilibrium for condition (ii-a) comes directly from Lemma
1; for condition (ii-b), for the sake of contradiction suppose
#»
f is an equilibrium and that
there exist some protocols gi ∈ G
#»
f
i and ri /∈ G
#»
f
i such that C
(
#»
f −i,gi)
i (
#»
h 0) > C
(
#»
f −i,ri)
i (
#»
h 0).
This means that ri is a better protocol than fi, thus (
#»
f −i, fi) is not an equilibrium, which is
a contradiction.
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To prove necessity of
#»
f being an equilibrium under conditions (ii-a) and (ii-b), for the
sake of contradiction, suppose (ii-a) and (ii-b) hold and
#»
f is not an equilibrium. Then
there must exist some protocol f ′i such that C
(
#»
f −i,f ′i)
i (
#»
h 0) < C
#»
f
i (
#»
h 0). Using (2) the latter
inequality can be written as∑
#»
h i,τ∗
C
(
#»
f −i,ri(hi,τ∗ ))
i (
#»
h 0)Pr{ #»h i,τ∗ happens for i} <
∑
#»
h i,τ∗
C
(
#»
f −i,gi(hi,τ∗ ))
i (
#»
h 0)Pr{ #»h i,τ∗ happens for i},
where gi(hi,τ∗) is consistent with
#»
f and ri(hi,τ∗) is consistent with (
#»
f −i, f ′i). Given the
conditions (ii-a) and (ii-b) the latter inequality is a contradiction.
3.2 Acknowledgment-based FIN-EQ protocols
Regarding the search for FIN-EQ protocols, there is no straight-forward way for our equi-
librium characterizations (previous subsection) to be used in order to find an equilibrium
protocol. However, they allow us to check whether the protocols discussed in this subsection
are equilibrium protocols. In this subsection we give FIN-EQ protocols for k = 2 and k = 3.
n players - 2 transmission channels. Here, we first give an example of a method
for checking equilibria (Theorem 1). Then, with a better approach, by employing our
characterizations of the previous subsection, we give an acknowledgement-based, equilibrium
protocol for n ∈ {2, 3, 4} players and k = 2 channels (Theorem 3). We define the following
memoryless protocol.
Protocol f : For any player i and every t ≥ 1 and transmission history #»h i,t−1,
fi,t(
#»
h i,t−1) =
(
Pr{Xi,t = 1} = 1
2
, Pr{Xi,t = 2} = 1
2
)
. (4)
Lemma 3. When all n ≥ 2 players use protocol f the expected latency of any player is 2n/n.
Proof. The process from the perspective of an arbitrary player i can be modelled as the
following Markov chain; the states are named after the number of remaining players including
i, and state 〈×〉 is the state where i finds herself after successful transmission.
We write pyx to denote the transition probability to go from state 〈x〉 to state 〈y〉. We
have
p×m =
(
1
2
)m−1
pm−1m = (m− 1)
(
1
2
)m−1
pmm = 1−m
(
1
2
)m−1
∀3 ≤ m ≤ n , and (5)
p×2 =
1
2
, p22 =
1
2
. (6)
The expected absorption time from state 〈n〉 to state 〈×〉 is found from the following set
of equations:
h×m = 1 + p
m
mh
×
m + p
m−1
m h
×
m−1, for all 3 ≤ m ≤ n,
and h×2 = 1 + p
2
2h
×
2 ,
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where hyx denotes the expected hitting time from state 〈x〉 to state 〈y〉. By solving this system
of linear equations we get
h×n =
2n
n
, for n ≥ 2.
The proof of the next theorem demonstrates the aforementioned method for checking
equilibrium protocols, and shows that indeed f of (4) is an equilibrium protocol for 3 players.
Theorem 1. For 3 players and 2 channels, f is an equilibrium protocol with expected latency
8/3.
Proof. Consider the Markov Decision Process (MDP) (T, St, As,t, pt(j|s, a), rt(s, a)), where
St is the state space for time t; As,t is the set of possible actions that can be taken after
observing state s at time t; pt(j|s, a) defines the transition probability to state j ∈ St+1
at time t + 1, and only depends on the state s and chosen action a at time t; rt(s, a) is
the cost function that determines the immediate cost for the agent’s choice of action a
while in state s. When the state s cannot be observed with certainty at time t, the agent
only knows a probability distribution, called belief state, over St. The process then is called
Partially Observable Markov Decision Process (POMDP). An optimal policy pi : S → A is a
function that rules, for each state or belief state, which action to perform, with an objective
to minimize the expected cost.
For the proof of the above theorem we will use the following property of POMDPs. This
property comes directly from the fact that an agent optimizing over all policies that every
time consider her exact state gets a better policy than an agent that knows a probability
distribution on the state space (belief states).
Proposition 1. An optimal policy pi1 of an agent in a POMDP yields as expected cost at
least the expected cost of the optimal policy pi2 of the corresponding MDP, in which at any
time t the agent observes her exact state.
To prove the above theorem we think as follows. Let us fix protocol f as defined in (4)
for two players, and let the remaining player i have an arbitrary protocol f ′i . Then let us
find the optimal policy for i. If and only if the optimal policy yields expected cost lower
than 8/3, which is the case where protocol f is used according to Lemma 3, then f is not an
equilibrium protocol. The game stated at Theorem 1, from player i’s perspective, is modelled
by a POMDP where each state is determined by the number of pending players, with an
additional absorbing state - where i goes after successfully transmitting - and i’s transmission
history for every t ≥ 1. Player i’s belief state at any time t is determined by her belief state
at time t− 1, the action she chose at time t− 1, and her observation (e.g. her transmission
history up to t − 1). This is a POMDP with infinite states, for which, to the best of our
knowledge, currently there are no methods in the literature for finding an optimal policy.
However, we will find the best policy and the expected cost of the corresponding MDP,
where player i knows in what state she finds herself after an action and observation. This
expected cost is a lower bound on the expected cost of the optimal policy of the original
POMDP. In the MDP we create, player i knows at any time t how many players are pending
and her transmission history up to time t.
Let p ∈ {1, 2, 3} indicate the number of pending players. Observe that the time steps
at which the process has a given p are consecutive; without loss of generality assume that
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for some p, the process is in the discrete time interval [τp, τp−1 − 1], where we set τ3 = 1.
Consider now the set Sp of all states sp(
#»
h i,t) of the MDP, where the number of pending
players p ∈ {1, 2, 3} is fixed, whereas the transmission history #»h i,t for τp ≤ t < τp−1 can vary.
Because of the protocol f being memoryless, the same action (probability distribution over
action space A) of i chosen at any state in Sp produces the same transition probabilities.
Therefore, choosing the optimal policy makes the set Sp of states collapse to a single state
sp, where p ∈ {1, 2, 3}. The resulting MDP is a finite MDP with states s1, s2, s3 and s×,
where the latter is an absorption state to which player i goes after a successful transmission.
Denote the expected cost of the MDP’s optimal policy given that the initial state is sp by
c(sp). In our problem the immediate cost for any combination of state and action is 1, since
we count the number of rounds in which i is pending. Using Lemma 5.4.2 and Theorem 5.4.3
of [19] we can find c(s3) by solving the following system of linear equations
c(sp) = 1 +
∑
s′∈{s1,s2,s3}
Pr(sp to s
′| policy pi)c(s′). (7)
Then, by minimizing each c(sp) over policies pi we get the optimal expected costs C(sp),
p ∈ {1, 2, 3}. As a byproduct of the minimization we find the best policy pi∗.
In our problem, a policy pi is a tuple (q1, z1, q2, z2, q3, z3), where qp, p ∈ {1, 2, 3} determines
the probability that player i will attempt a transmission, and zp, p ∈ {1, 2, 3} determines the
probability that she will attempt the transmission on channel a = 1. To give a small example,
for a given state sp, (Pr(Xt = 0),Pr(Xt = 1),Pr(Xt = 2)) = (1 − qp, qpzp, qp(1 − zp)). By
solving system (7), we get that
c(s1) =
1
q1
, c(s2) =
2 + 2q1 − 2q2
2q1 − q1q2 , c(s3) = 2 +
4− 2q2 − 2q2q3 + 2q1q2q3
4q1 − 2q1q2 + 2q1q3 − q1q2q3
which implies that a policy does not depend on any of the zp’s. Now, by minimizing the
above expected costs we get C(s1) = 1, C(s2) = 2 and C(s3) = 8/3 for q1 = 1 and q3 = 1.
Note that the optimal policy allows z1, z2, z3 and q2 to be arbitrary probabilities. q2 being
even 0 is not a contradiction since in our MDP the player is always aware of the pending
players (state); in the case where q2 = 0, when the player is in state s2, she waits one round
until the other player transmits successfully and then realizes that she is alone pending in s1;
in the next round she transmits with probability 1.
We have shown that a best policy of an advantageous player gives them the same expected
latency as protocol f defined in (4) (the expected latency of f is given by Lemma 3). This,
combined with Proposition 1 completes the proof of Theorem 1.
In our proof above, we made use of Proposition 1 which allows us to create an advantageous
player with the ability to observe her own exact state. As a consequence, this ability is
exploited by the player and yields for her an optimal policy with expected latency upper
bounded by the one she would have without this extra ability. Such a relaxation can potentially
produce no result at all in case the expected latency of the advantageous player in her optimal
policy is less than the expected latency of the initial player’s optimal policy. In our case, we
are lucky to find that our protocol for the initial player is indeed an optimal policy for the
advantageous player, hence the result. However, in order to circumvent the inconclusiveness
of this method, we exploit the lack of memory and the anonymity of our protocol and show
a more general result on equilibria (Theorem 3), using the characterizations from Subsection
3.1.
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Theorem 2. In a contention game with k = 2 channels, consider an anonymous, memoryless
protocol of player i with the property: Pr{Xi,t = 0} = 0, for every t ≥ 1. For more than 4
players any such protocol is not an equilibrium protocol.
Proof. Assume that an anonymous protocol f as stated in the theorem is an equilibrium
protocol for n ≥ 5 players. We will show that condition (ii-b) of Lemma 2 does not hold.
That is, if n ≥ 5 players use a protocol f with the property that in each time its decision
rule assigns zero probability to “no transmission”, then there exists a best response that
yields strictly better expected latency for an arbitrary player.
Suppose f is an equilibrium protocol. f consists of a decision rule for each time slot t, i.e. a
probability distribution on the available channels (with probability 0 of “no transmission” as
the theorem’s statement requires). Since all players use this protocol, in an arbitrary time t all
players have the same distribution on the channels. For the sake of contradiction, suppose there
is some t′ for which the decision rule is other than
(
Pr{Xi,t = 1} = 12 , Pr{Xi,t = 2} = 12
)
.
Without loss of generality, we have Pr{Xi,t = 1} > Pr{Xi,t = 2}. Thus, an arbitrary player i,
at time t, can unilaterally change her distribution to (Pr{Xi,t = 1} = 0, Pr{Xi,t = 2} = 1)
and increase her probability of transmitting successfully in the specific round. As a consequence
her expected latency would strictly decrease, hence a protocol with a decision rule with
different probabilities on each channel cannot be in a symmetric equilibrium. Therefore, the
anonymous, equilibrium protocol f , with the property Pr{Xi,t = 0} = 0 for every t ≥ 1,
prescribes
(
Pr{Xi,t = 1} = 12 , Pr{Xi,t = 2} = 12
)
for every t ≥ 1. The expected latency of
a player using such a protocol, when there are n pending players, is found in Lemma 3 to be
2n/n.
We will show that, when the number of pending players at t = 0 is n ≥ 5, protocol
gi ,
{
(Pr{Xi,1 = 1} = 0, Pr{Xi,1 = 2} = 0)(
Pr{Xi,t = 1} = 12 , Pr{Xi,t = 2} = 12
)
, for t ≥ 2,
is a better response for an arbitrary player i, that is, C
(f−i,gi)
i (
#»
h i,0) < C
f
i (
#»
h i,0) = 2
n/n.
Suppose player i uses protocol gi when there are n ≥ 5 pending players at t = 0. At time
t = 2 she is not aware of the number of players that remain pending. However, there are two
cases, either n players are pending in case none of the other n−1 players in t = 1 transmitted
successfully, or n− 1 players remain in case only one of the other n− 1 players transmitted
successfully in t = 1. Note that there is no way that two players cannot simultaneously
transmit successfully in round t = 2 due to the given protocol f and the number of pending
players. The probability for each of the two aforementioned events is,
Pn−1(x) =
n−1∑
r=x
(−1)r−x
(
r
x
)(
2
r
)(
n− 1
r
)
r!
(
1
2
)r (
1− r
2
)n−1−r
where x is the number of players that transmit successfully, 00 , 1, and
(
a
b
)
, 0 for a < b.
To see how this formula is produced, please refer to the proof of Lemma 5 (Section 5), up to
equation (21). Here, equation (21) is used for z = 1 and k = 2.
In order to capture the dependence of the expected future cost (after history ht−1) on
the number of pending players n, when player i uses gi and the rest of the players use f , we
denote it by F
(
#»
f −i,gi)
i,n (
#»
h i,t−1). Similarly, we denote the expected latency by C
(
#»
f −i,gi)
i,n (
#»
h i,t−1).
We have,
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C
(f−i,gi)
i,n (
#»
h i,0) = F
(f−i,gi)
i,n (
#»
h i,0) = 1 + Pn−1(0)F
(f−i,gi)
i,n (
#»
h i,1) + Pn−1(1)F
(f−i,gi)
i,n−1 (
#»
h i,1)
= 1 + Pn−1(0)
2n
n
+ Pn−1(1)
2n−1
n− 1 . (8)
For n ≥ 5, our formula in (21) gives Pn−1(0) = 1 − (n − 1)
(
1
2
)n−2
and Pn−1(1) =
(n− 1) (12)n−2. Therefore (8) becomes
C
(f−i,gi)
i,n (
#»
h i,0) = 1 +
[
1− (n− 1)
(
1
2
)n−2] 2n
n
+ (n− 1)
(
1
2
)n−2 2n−1
n− 1
=
2n
n
+
4
n
− 1
<
2n
n
, for n > 4
= Cfi,n(
#»
h i,0).
Thus protocol gi yields strictly smaller expected latency than fi for player i when n ≥ 5, and
this means that f is not a symmetric equilibrium for n ≥ 5.
Since protocol f defined in equation (4) belongs to the class of protocols defined in the
statement of Theorem 2, the following corollary is immediate.
Corollary 2. For n ≥ 5 players and k = 2 channels, f defined in (4) is not an equilibrium
protocol.
Now we prove two lemmata that, combined with our second characterization of equilibria
(Lemma 2), result to one of this section’s main theorems (Theorem 3) that determines
equilibrium protocols for n ∈ {2, 3, 4} players and k = 2 channels. In particular, we will
show that for number of players n = 2, n = 3 and n = 4, when n− 1 players use f , if some
deviator unilaterally chooses any possible protocol gi as defined in (1) that is consistent with
#»
f , she will suffer the same expected latency, namely 2n/n. Then, we will show that if the
deviator unilaterally chooses any possible protocol as defined in (1) that is not consistent
with
#»
f , she will suffer at least the expected latency as 2n/n. These two facts, by Lemma 2,
show that f is an equilibrium protocol for n ∈ {2, 3, 4}.
Lemma 3.A. For n ≥ 2 players and k = 2 channels, any player i that follows protocol
gi ∈ Gf in the profile (f−i, gi), where f is defined in (4), has expected latency 2n/n.
Proof. Consider the contention game with fixed number of players n ≥ 2 and 2 channels.
n− 1 players use protocol f and a player i ∈ [n] uses some protocol gi(hi,τ∗) ∈ Gf as defined
in (1), for some τ∗ ≥ 1. To make easier our reference to the expected future latency of a
player in the special case where (almost) all players follow protocol f of (4), and to capture
the number of players in the notation, we will denote by D(f ′i , n) , E[Ti|
#»
h i,0, (
#»
f −i, f ′i)] and
D(fi, n) , E[Ti| #»h i,0, #»f ] the expected future latency of player i when n players participate.
First we show that condition (ii-a) of Lemma 2 holds for every n ≥ 2. From Lemma 3
we know that D(fi, n) = 2
n/n, for every i ∈ [n]. Now observe that the set of all protocols
gi(τ
∗) as defined in 1 that are consistent with fi, consists of the protocols for which at 6= 0
for every 1 ≤ t ≤ τ∗ for any τ∗ ≥ 1. That is, for all possible tuples (a1, a2, . . . , aτ∗) of a given
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τ∗, there is no t ≤ τ∗ for which at = 0, and this is for all τ∗ ≥ 1, since a history with “no
transmission attempt” in it is not consistent with f . Given a tuple hi,τ∗ = (a1, a2, . . . , aτ∗),
denote by xt the indicator variable that equals 1 if player i chooses channel 1, and 0 if she
chooses channel 2 in round t ≤ τ∗. Formally, a protocol as described above is
gi = gi(hi,τ∗) ,
{
(Pr{Xi,t = 1} = xt, Pr{Xi,t = 2} = 1− xt) , for 1 ≤ t ≤ τ∗
fi,t , for t > τ
∗,
This process where a single player i uses some protocol gi and has a latency according to gi
and the other players’ fixed protocols, can be modelled as a Partially Observable Markov
Decision Process (POMDP) with infinite states; in this POMDP, each state is determined by
the transmission history of player i and the number of pending players including i, with an
additional absorbing state where i goes after successfully transmitting; player i’s belief state
at any time t is determined by her belief state at time t− 1, the action she chose at time
t− 1, and her observation (e.g. her transmission history up to t− 1).
The fact that we consider acknowledgement-based protocols together with the fact that
the partial protocol profile f−i which produces our POMDP consists of memoryless and
time-independent protocols, make the states of our POMDP be independent of player i’s
history. We now remark that, regardless of the action taken in some belief state from player
i playing gi, the transition probabilities between belief states are independent of time. In
particular, denote by 〈m, t〉 a state with m pending players including player i at time t ≥ 1,
and by 〈×〉 the unique absorption state where i finds herself after successful transmission.
We write pyx to denote the transition probability to go from state 〈x〉 to state 〈y〉. It is easy
to see that the transition probabilities among belief states with 1 ≤ t ≤ τ∗ are
p×m,t =
(
1
2
)m−1
pm−1,t+1m,t = (m− 1)
(
1
2
)m−1
pm,t+1m,t = 1−m
(
1
2
)m−1
∀3 ≤ m ≤ n, 1 ≤ t ≤ τ∗,
and p×2,t =
1
2
, p2,t+12,t =
1
2
.
Observe that the above transition probabilities of any state for which 1 ≤ t ≤ τ∗ are
identical to those of equations (5) and (6) in the proof of Lemma 3; obviously for t > τ∗ the
same holds because player i has switched back to protocol f . Since player i’s actions do not
affect the transition probabilities of the resulting belief states, the above POMDP reduces to
a Markov chain that is in fact identical to the one defined in the proof of Lemma 3, thus
D(gi, n) = D(fi, n) = 2
n/n.
The natural explanation for our POMDP resulting to the above Markov chain is that,
if for a given round all players have a given probability of transmission (not necessarily 1)
uniformly distributed on the channels and a single deviator picks an arbitrary distribution on
the channels for the same probability of transmission (in this case 1), then: (a) the probability
with which she transmits successfully remains unchanged because each channel is blocked
with equal probability (1− 1/2n−1) by the rest of the players, and (b) the probabilities with
which a specific number s of players (excluding i) transmit successfully remain unchanged
because, the probability of s players successfully transmitting conditional on i choosing any
of the channels is the same (due to the uniform distributions on the channels by the rest of
the players) regardless of the channel chosen by i.
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Remark: The above arguments hold also in the case of any number k ≥ 1 of channels
when an anonymous, memoryless protocol f is used by all players except i, where f is defined
by a probability 0 < z ≤ 1 that is split uniformly on the channels in every time-step (in
our proof, k = 2 and z = 1 for all t > 0). In such a case the POMDP is reduced to a
corresponding Markov chain that is produced when all players follow f .
Lemma 3.B. For 2 ≤ n ≤ 4 players and k = 2 channels, any player i that follows protocol
ri /∈ Gf in the profile (f−i, ri), where f is defined in (4), has expected latency at least 2n/n.
Proof. Consider the contention game with fixed number of players n ∈ {2, 3, 4} and 2 channels.
n− 1 players use protocol f and a player i ∈ [n] uses some protocol ri = ri(hi,τ∗) /∈ Gf as
defined in (1), for some τ∗ ≥ 1. It is sufficient to show that the lemma holds, when ri is a best
response to f−i, where ri is constrained to be inconsistent with (f−i, fi). Therefore, among
such best responses ri there has to be one with a round t <∞ for which Pr{Xi,t = 0} > 0 by
definition of inconsistency. Let us focus on the smallest such t which we will call from now on
t0, i.e. t0 , inf{t : Pr{Xi,t = 0} > 0}. Let us now define the set of protocols ri(hi,t0) /∈ G
#»
f for
the aforementioned t0. There are two categories of such protocols: Category (1) has at0 6= 0,
and Category (2) has at0 = 0. Each of those categories is partitioned in two other categories:
Category (I) has Pr{Xi,t = 0} = 0 for every t > t0, and Category (II) has Pr{Xi,t = 0} > 0
for some t > t0. The categories are presented in Table 1 below.
Category 1 at0 6= 0
Category 2 at0 = 0
Category I ∀t > t0: Pr{Xi,t = 0} = 0
Category II ∃t > t0: Pr{Xi,t = 0} > 0
Table 1. The categories of protocol ri(hi,t0).
Right before time t0 there are n possible cases that could have occurred: m players
are pending including player i, for 1 ≤ m ≤ n. In each of those cases we want to find the
expected future latency of a player i that unilaterally uses protocol ri(hi,t0), given history
#»
h i,t0−1, and given that the pending players right before time t0 are m; we will denote this by
F
(
#»
f −i,ri)
i,m (
#»
h i,t0−1). We will prove our claim step by step, starting from protocols of Category
(I) which are easier to analyze, and move on to protocols of Category (II); we start the
analysis from the case with the least possible players and build up to the required number of
players.
Starting with Category (1-I), the analysis of the proof of Lemma 3.A implies that these
protocols ri yield the same expected latency as fi in the tuple f , since their process’ Markov
chain is identical to this of the case (f−i, fi). For Category (2-I), player i does not transmit
at t0. Given that right before t0 there are m pending players including i, at t0 either all m
players remain pending, or m− 1, or m− 2; the first event occurs when none of the m− 1
players using protocol f at t0 transmitted successfully, the second when only one of them
did, and the third when two of them did. The probability for each of those events is Pm−1(x),
where x is the number of players that transmit successfully, and can be found in (21) for
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k = 2 and z = 1. Therefore we have,
F
(
#»
f −i,ri)
i,m (
#»
h i,t0−1) = 1 + Pm−1(0)F
(
#»
f −i,f ′i)
i,m (
#»
h i,t0) + Pm−1(1)F
(
#»
f −i,f ′i)
i,m−1 (
#»
h i,t0)
+ Pm−1(2)F
(
#»
f −i,f ′i)
i,m−2 (
#»
h i,t0)
= 1 + Pm−1(0)D(fi,m) + Pm−1(1)D(fi,m− 1) + Pm−1(2)D(fi,m− 2)
(9)
For m = 1 it is P0(0) = 1, and P0(1) = P0(2) = 0. For m = 2 it is P1(0) = P1(2) = 0,
and P1(1) = 1. For m = 3 it is P2(0) = P2(2) =
1
2 , and P2(1) = 0. For m = 4 it is
P3(0) = 1− 3
(
1
2
)2
, P3(1) = 3
(
1
2
)2
, and P3(2) = 0.
Now, using (9), we can see that for 1 ≤ m ≤ 4 it is F (
#»
f −i,ri)
i,m (
#»
h i,t0−1) ≥ F (
#»
f −i,fi)
i,m (
#»
h i,t0−1) =
D(fi,m) = 2
m/m. In particular,
for m = 1 : 2 ≥ 1,
for m = 2 : 2 ≥ 2,
for m = 3 :
17
6
≥ 8
3
, and
for m = 4 : 4 ≥ 4.
Equivalently, C
(
#»
f −i,ri)
i,m (
#»
h i,t0−1) ≥ C(
#»
f −i,fi)
i,m (
#»
h i,t0−1), and therefore, due to (2), C
(
#»
f −i,ri)
i,m (
#»
h i,0) ≥
C
(
#»
f −i,fi)
i,m (
#»
h i,0) for 1 ≤ m ≤ 4. Thus, for Category (I) and 2 ≤ n ≤ 4, condition (ii-b) of
Lemma 2 holds.
For Category (1-II), we prove our claim for 1 ≤ m ≤ 4 pending players right before t0.
For m = 1, obviously F
(
#»
f −i,ri)
i,1 (
#»
h i,t0−1) = 1, which is also the minimum possible when only
one player is pending. For m = 2, we have
F
(
#»
f −i,ri)
i,2 (
#»
h i,t0−1) = 1 + Pr{No player transmits successfully}F (
#»
f −i,f ′i)
i,2 (
#»
h i,t0)
Now, given that the protocol f used by all players apart from i is time-independent, it should
be F
(
#»
f −i,ri)
i,2 (
#»
h i,t0−1) = F
(
#»
f −i,f ′i)
i,2 (
#»
h i,t0). Because if F
(
#»
f −i,ri)
i,2 (
#»
h i,t0−1) < F
(
#»
f −i,f ′i)
i,2 (
#»
h i,t0) or
F
(
#»
f −i,ri)
i,2 (
#»
h i,t0−1) > F
(
#»
f −i,f ′i)
i,2 (
#»
h i,t0), then f
′
i is not a best response; in the former situation
player i would prefer ri(hi,t0) over f
′
i ; in the latter situation she would prefer a modified
protocol ri(h
′
i,t0
) with Pr{Xi,t0 6= 0} = 0 over the current ri(hi,t0), respectively. The proba-
bility of no player transmitting successfully in t0 is 1/2, thus we get F
(
#»
f −i,ri)
i,2 (
#»
h i,t0−1) = 2 =
F
(
#»
f −i,fi)
i,2 (
#»
h i,t0−1), which implies C
(
#»
f −i,ri)
i,2 (
#»
h i,t0−1) = C
(
#»
f −i,fi)
i,2 (
#»
h i,t0−1).
For m = 3, we have
F
(
#»
f −i,ri)
i,3 (
#»
h i,t0−1) = 1 + Pr{No player transmits successfully}F (
#»
f −i,f ′i)
i,3 (
#»
h i,t0)
+ Pr{Exactly 1 player other than i transmits successfully}F (
#»
f −i,f ′i)
i,2 (
#»
h i,t0)
(10)
From the previous step, we know that a best response to f−i when there are 2 players pending
including i yields expected latency to i equal to 2. Also, the probability that exactly one
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player other than i transmits successfully when there are 3 players pending, is 1/2. So, (10)
gives
F
(
#»
f −i,ri)
i,3 (
#»
h i,t0−1) ≥ 2 + Pr{No player transmits successfully}F (
#»
f −i,f ′i)
i,3 (
#»
h i,t0)
Again, given that the protocol f used by all players apart from i is time-independent,
it should be F
(
#»
f −i,ri)
i,3 (
#»
h i,t0−1) = F
(
#»
f −i,f ′i)
i,3 (
#»
h i,t0) for the same reasons explained in the
case of m = 2. The probability of no player transmitting successfully in t0 is 1/2, thus
we get F
(
#»
f −i,ri)
i,3 (
#»
h i,t0−1) ≥ 8/3 = F (
#»
f −i,fi)
i,3 (
#»
h i,t0−1), which implies C
(
#»
f −i,ri)
i,3 (
#»
h i,t0−1) ≥
C
(
#»
f −i,fi)
i,3 (
#»
h i,t0−1).
Finally, for m = 4, we have
F
(
#»
f −i,ri)
i,4 (
#»
h i,t0−1) = 1 + Pr{No player transmits successfully}F (
#»
f −i,f ′i)
i,4 (
#»
h i,t0)
+ Pr{Exactly 1 player other than i transmits successfully}F (
#»
f −i,f ′i)
i,3 (
#»
h i,t0)
(11)
From the previous step, we know that a best response to f−i when there are 3 players pending
including i yields expected latency to i at least 8/3. Also, the probability that exactly one
player other than i transmits successfully when there are 4 players pending, is 3/8. So, (11)
gives
F
(
#»
f −i,ri)
i,4 (
#»
h i,t0−1) ≥ 2 + Pr{No player transmits successfully}F (
#»
f −i,f ′i)
i,4 (
#»
h i,t0)
Again, given that the protocol f used by all players apart from i is time-independent,
it should be F
(
#»
f −i,ri)
i,4 (
#»
h i,t0−1) = F
(
#»
f −i,f ′i)
i,4 (
#»
h i,t0) for the same reasons explained for m ∈
{2, 3}. The probability of no player transmitting successfully in t0 is 1/2, thus we get
F
(
#»
f −i,ri)
i,4 (
#»
h i,t0−1) ≥ 4 = F (
#»
f −i,fi)
i,4 (
#»
h i,t0−1), which implies C
(
#»
f −i,ri)
i,4 (
#»
h i,t0−1) ≥ C(
#»
f −i,fi)
i,4 (
#»
h i,t0−1).
Thus, for Category (1-II) and 2 ≤ n ≤ 4, condition (ii-b) of Lemma 2 holds.
Now we proceed with the proof of the statement for 1 ≤ m ≤ 4 for the final category,
namely Category (2-II), using the results from Category (1-II). For every m ≥ 1, equation
(8) holds. For m = 1, we have
F
(
#»
f −i,ri)
i,1 (
#»
h i,t0−1) = 1 + 1 · F (
#»
f −i,f ′i)
i,1 (
#»
h i,t0) ≥ 2,
where the above inequality comes from the fact that the minimum expected future latency
for m = 1 is 1 (found in Category (1-II)). By applying the same methodology for 2 ≤ m ≤ 4
we have
F
(
#»
f −i,ri)
i,m (
#»
h i,t0−1) ≥ 3 +
[
1− (m− 1)
(
1
2
)m−2] 2m
m
≥ 2
m
m
= F
(
#»
f −i,fi)
i,m (
#»
h i,t0−1).
Then, by taking into account our lower bounds for F
(
#»
f −i,ri)
i (
#»
h i,t) when 0 ≤ t ≤ t0 − 1
and for all possible numbers m of remaining players (including i), we get
F
(
#»
f −i,ri)
i (
#»
h i,t0−1) ≥ F (
#»
f −i,fi)
i (
#»
h i,t0−1), which implies C
(
#»
f −i,ri)
i (
#»
h i,t0−1) ≥ C(
#»
f −i,fi)
i (
#»
h i,t0−1).
Then, from Corollary 1 and equation (2) it is C
(
#»
f −i,f ′i)
i (
#»
h i,0) ≥ C(
#»
f −i,fi)
i (
#»
h i,0) and this
completes the proof.
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Theorem 3. For n ∈ {2, 3, 4} players and k = 2 channels, f defined in (4) is an equilibrium
protocol with expected latencies 2, 8/3 and 4, respectively.
Proof. By combining Lemma 3.A, Lemma 3.B and the equilibrium characterization of Lemma
2.
n players - 3 transmission channels. Here, by employing our characterizations of
the previous subsection, we give an acknowledgement-based, equilibrium protocol for n ∈
{2, 3, 4, 5} players and k = 3 channels.
We define the following memoryless protocol f : for any player i, every t ≥ 1 and
transmission history
#»
h i,t−1,
fi,t(
#»
h i,t−1) =
(
Pr{Xi,t = 1} = 1
3
, Pr{Xi,t = 2} = 1
3
, Pr{Xi,t = 3} = 1
3
)
. (12)
Theorem 4. For n ∈ {2, 3, 4, 5} players and k = 3 channels, f defined in (12) is an
equilibrium protocol with expected latencies 3/2, 15/8, 189/80 and 597/200, respectively.
Proof. The proof idea is the same way as that of Theorem 3. However, the analysis here
has been done for specific cases, since we do not have a general formula for the expected
latency of n players using protocol f for 3 channels. This is because, although using standard
Markov chain techniques a linear recurrence relation of the expected latency is easily found,
this recurrence relation has non-constant coefficients, for which - to our knowledge - there
are no techniques in the literature to solve them3.
We first find the expected latencies in the cases stated in the theorem, using Markov
chain analysis, as in the proof of Lemma 3. We refer the reader to this proof since the states
of the chain and the transition edges between states are the same with the additional ones
pm−2m for 4 ≤ m ≤ n, and initial conditions
p×3 =
4
9
, p33 =
1
9
, p23 =
4
9
, and
p×2 =
2
3
, p22 =
1
3
.
We calculate the transition probabilities to be
p×5 =
48
243
, p55 =
63
243
, p45 =
96
243
, p35 =
36
243
, and
p×4 =
24
81
, p44 =
21
81
, p34 =
18
81
, p24 =
18
81
.
Then, for each n ∈ {2, 3, 4, 5}, the expected absorption time from state 〈n〉 to state 〈×〉 is
found from the following set of equations:
h×m = 1 + p
m
mh
×
m + p
m−1
m h
×
m−1 + p
m−2
m h
×
m−2, for all 4 ≤ m ≤ n,
h×3 = 1 + p
3
3h
×
3 + p
2
3h
×
2 ,
and h×2 = 1 + p
2
2h
×
2 ,
3We note that reducing the recurrence relation to one with constant coefficients using already existing
techniques did not work.
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where hyx denotes the expected hitting time from state 〈x〉 to state 〈y〉. By solving this system
of linear equations we get
h×2 =
3
2
, h×3 =
15
8
, h×4 =
189
80
, and h×5 =
597
200
.
At this point we are ready to check whether the conditions of Lemma 2 hold. For the
same reason as in the proof of Theorem 3, condition (ii-a) of Lemma 2 holds for every n ≥ 2.
For condition (ii-b), consider player i ∈ [n] picking a protocol ri as defined in (3) that is not
consistent with f . This protocol has to have at least one “0” in its tuple (ai,1, ai,2, . . . , ai,τ∗)
for some τ∗ ≥ 1. Let us focus on the last zero of the ai,t sequence, which suppose happens
at time t0. Right before time t0 there are n possible cases: m players are pending including
player i, for 1 ≤ m ≤ n, hence the same cases are for time right before t0 + 1. In each of
those cases we want to find the expected latency of a player i that unilaterally uses protocol
ri, given history
#»
h i,t0−1, given that the pending players right before time t0 are m; we will
denote this by C
(
#»
f −i,ri)
i,m (
#»
h i,t0−1). The transition probabilities needed can be found from
equation (21) of Lemma for k = 3, thus we have
C
(
#»
f −i,ri)
i,m (
#»
h i,t0−1) = 1 + Pm−1(0)C
(
#»
f −i,ri)
i,m (
#»
h i,t0) + Pm−1(1)C
(
#»
f −i,ri)
i,m−1 (
#»
h i,t0) + Pm−1(2)C
(
#»
f −i,ri)
i,m−2 (
#»
h i,t0)
= 1 + Pm−1(0)D(fi,m) + Pm−1(1)D(fi,m− 1) + Pm−1(2)D(fi,m− 2).
By substituting in C
(
#»
f −i,ri)
i,m (
#»
h i,t0−1) ≥ C(
#»
f −i,fi)
i,m (
#»
h i,t0−1), for 1 ≤ m ≤ 5, we get
for m = 1 : 1 + 1 ≥ 1,
for m = 2 : 1 + 1 ≥ 3
2
,
for m = 3 : 1 +
1
3
· 15
8
+
2
3
· 1 ≥ 15
8
,
for m = 4 : 1 +
1
9
· 189
80
+
6
9
· 15
8
+
2
9
· 1 ≥ 189
80
, and
for m = 5 : 1 +
21
81
· 597
200
+
24
81
· 189
80
+
36
81
· 15
8
≥ 597
200
.
Thus, for 2 ≤ n ≤ 5 condition (ii-b) of Lemma 2 holds and this completes the proof.
An impossibility result on “equilibria with blocking step” We first prove two lemmata
that lead to the main theorem of this paragraph.
Lemma 3.C. Suppose all players use an anonymous, acknowledgement-based, equilibrium
protocol f that has finite expected latency. If the event that history hi,t0 is common for all
pending players m ≥ 2 for some t0 ≥ 0 is nonempty, then the decision rule fi,t0+1(ht0) cannot
assign transmission probability 0 to some channel.
Proof. For the sake of contradiction, assume that all pending players m ≥ 2 have the same
history hi,t0 at time t0 ≥ 0 and use an anonymous, acknowledgement-based, equilibrium
protocol f that has finite expected latency. Also, suppose that their (common) decision rule
fi,t0+1(hi,t0) is a probability distribution on the set of actions A with probability 0 on an
arbitrary channel j ∈ K.
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Consider now the following protocol f ′i for player i ∈ N
f ′i,t(hi,t−1) =
{
fi,t(hi,t−1), for t ≥ 1 with t 6= t0 + 1
(Pr{Xi,t0+1 = j} = 1, Pr{Xi,t0+1 6= j} = 0) .
Since by following f player i has positive probability of transmitting successfully later than
t0 + 1 (guaranteed when the pending players are m ≥ 2), we have
Cfi (ht0) ≥ Pr{i is successful in t0 + 1} · (t0 + 1) + Pr{i is successful after t0 + 1} · (t0 + 2)
> t0 + 1
= C
(f−i,f ′i)
i (ht0), (13)
where the last equality comes from the fact that in the profile (f−i, f ′i) player i transmits
successfully at t0 + 1 with probability 1. Now, observe that protocol f
′
i is the same as fi for
t ≤ t0, and also Pr{hi,t0 happens for i} > 0 for both f and (f−i, f ′i). Then, from equation (2)
for τ∗ = t0, by using (13) and the fact that the expected latency given any possible history
is finite (according to the lemma’s statement), we get Cfi (h0) > C
(f−i,f ′i)
i (h0) and f is not an
equilibrium protocol, which is a contradiction.
Lemma 3.D. Suppose all players use an anonymous, acknowledgement-based, equilibrium
protocol f that has finite expected latency. If the event that history hi,t0 is common for all
pending players m ≥ 2 for some t0 ≥ 0 is nonempty, then the decision rule fi,t0+1(ht0) cannot
be a non-uniform distribution on the set of channels K.
Proof. Assume that all pending players m ≥ 2 have the same history hi,t0 at time t0 ≥ 0 and
use an anonymous, equilibrium protocol f . Also, suppose that their (common) decision rule
fi,t0+1(hi,t0) is a probability distribution on the set of actions A which is non-uniform on the
set K (= A \ {0}). Then, there exist two channels h, l ∈ K with the highest and the lowest
transmission probability respectively which are not equal. That is, fi,t0+1(ht0) assigns the
highest transmission probability H , maxc∈K Pr{Xi,t0+1 = c} to some channel h ∈ K and
the lowest transmission probability L , minc∈K Pr{Xi,t0+1 = c} to some channel l ∈ K, and
certainly H > L.
Now, for an arbitrary player i ∈ N , create the tuples #»a , (hi,t0 , h) and
#»
b , (hi,t0 , l),
and consider the following respective protocols:
gi = gi(
#»a ) ,
{
(Pr{Xi,t = at} = 1, Pr{Xi,t 6= at} = 0) , for 1 ≤ t ≤ t0 + 1
fi,t, for t > t0 + 1,
ri = ri(
#»
b ) ,
{
(Pr{Xi,t = bt} = 1, Pr{Xi,t 6= bt} = 0) , for 1 ≤ t ≤ t0 + 1
fi,t, for t > t0 + 1.
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We have
C
(f−i,gi)
i (ht0) = t0 + F
(f−i,gi)
i (ht0)
= t0 + 1 + Pr{i using gi transmits successfully at h in t0 + 1} · 0
+ Pr{i using gi has collision at h in t0 + 1} · F (f−i,gi)i (hi,t0 , h)
= t0 + 1 + Pr{i using gi has collision at h in t0 + 1} · F fi (hi,t0+1)
> t0 + 1 + Pr{i using ri has collision at l in t0 + 1} · F fi (hi,t0+1)
= t0 + 1 + Pr{i using ri transmits successfully at l in t0 + 1} · 0
+ Pr{i using ri has collision at l in t0 + 1} · F (f−i,ri)i (hi,t0 , l)
= t0 + F
(f−i,ri)
i (ht0)
= C
(f−i,ri)
i (ht0). (14)
The third and fourth equalities above follow from the definition of protocols gi and ri. The
inequality follows from the below fact.
Pr{i using gi has collision at h in t0 + 1} = 1− Pr{i using gi transmits successfully at h in t0 + 1}
= 1− (1−H)m−1
> 1− (1− L)m−1
= 1− Pr{i using ri transmits successfully at l in t0 + 1}
= Pr{i using ri has collision at l in t0 + 1},
where m ≥ 2 is the number of pending players after t0.
Then, from equation (2) for τ∗ = t0, by using (14) and the fact that the expected
latency given any possible history is finite (according to the lemma’s statement), we get
C
(f−i,gi(hi,t0 ))
i (h0) > C
(f−i,ri(hi,t0 ))
i (h0). Note, however, that protocols gi and ri are consistent
with f . Since, as we have assumed, f is an equilibrium protocol, Lemma 2 reveals that the
latter inequality is a contradiction.
Now we can prove the main theorem of this paragraph. First, let us define the following
notion of equilibrium protocol: By equilibrium with blocking step (EBS) we call an anonymous,
equilibrium protocol with the property that there exists a time-step of the protocol in which
every pending player has probability of successful transmission equal to 0.
Theorem 4.A. For the setting with k ≥ 2 channels and n ≥ 2 players using acknowledgement-
based protocols, there exists no equilibrium with blocking step (EBS) and finite expected latency.
Proof. Consider an anonymous, acknowledgement-based, equilibrium protocol f , which has
finite expected latency and it is used by n ≥ 2 players in the setting with k ≥ 2 channels.
Since the contention game initiates from the symmetric situation where all players have
empty history, and since the players are not distinct through personal IDs, the event that
all players choose the same action at t = 1 is nonempty. Then, each player i has the same
history hi,1, therefore by the same argument, the event that all players choose the same
action at t = 2 is nonempty. By induction we can see that the event that all m = n ≥ 2
players have the same history hi,t0 is nonempty for any t0 ≥ 0.
Then Lemma 3.C and Lemma 3.D hold, and the only possible equilibrium protocols
consist of decision rules which are nonzero uniform distributions over the set of channels K.
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In other words, in an equilibrium at any time t ≥ 1 a pending player will assign to every
channel transmission probability zt/k, where 0 < zt ≤ 1 is the player’s total transmission
probability. Since k ≥ 2, it will be zt/k ≤ 1/2 < 1 and hence there is no t ≥ 1 in which a
player (using f) can assign transmission probability 1 to some channel. Therefore, in every
t ≥ 1 there is a positive probability that on any arbitrary channel no player other than i will
attempt transmission. In other words, in every t ≥ 1 of a symmetric equilibrium there is a
positive probability that a player can transmit successfully, and therefore by definition, it
cannot be an EBS.
22
APPENDIX
4 Equilibria for Ternary Feedback Protocols
In this section we consider anonymous protocols with ternary feedback, that is, a pending
player knows at every time t the number m ≤ n of pending players. This knowledge is given
to each player regardless of her transmission history.
4.1 Nash equilibria characterization
Here we give a characterization of FIN-EQ protocols for n ≥ 1 players and k = 2 channels in
the general history-dependent case for ternary feedback.
Theorem 5. There exists an anonymous, history-dependent, equilibrium protocol with
ternary feedback for n players and 2 transmission channels.
Proof. Suppose n ≥ 2 players use the same protocol f in a system with 2 available transmis-
sion channels. At time t, the decision rule of a player with history ht−1 among m pending
players is described by the probabilities with which she will transmit on channel 1 and
channel 2, i.e. pi,1m,t and p
i,2
m,t respectively. These transmission probabilities, in general, depend
on the history ht of the respective player, however t is used instead as a subscript in order to
make the notation lighter.
Also, suppose that the anonymous protocol f is an equilibrium and also that pi,1m,t 6= pi,2m,t.
Without loss of generality pi,1m,t > p
i,2
m,t. Then a player could unilaterally deviate at round t
and choose to transmit on channel 2 with probability 1, thus maximizing her probability of
success. Therefore, in an anonymous, equilibrium protocol, for every history ht−1 and every
number m ≥ 2 of pending players, each player assigns equal transmission probabilities to the
channels. Hence we drop the channel indicator superscript - along with the player indicator
superscript - and write pm,t. Note that pm,t ∈ [0, 12 ].
We will slightly abuse the notation here and write Cm(ht) and Fm(ht) for the expected
cost of a player (e.g. Alice) and the expected future cost of a player respectively, at time t ≥ 0,
given history ht, where there are 1 ≤ m ≤ n pending players. Note that, since the protocol is
symmetric, we have replaced the subscript that indicates the player’s identity with the one
that indicates the number of pending players, and we also have omitted the superscript f .
We have4
Cm(ht) = P
×
m · (t+ 1) + Pm−1m · Cm−1(ht+1) + Pm−2m · Cm−2(ht+1) + Pmm · Cm(ht+1)
or equivalently, Fm(ht) = 1 + P
m−1
m · Fm−1(ht+1) + Pm−2m · Fm−2(ht+1) + Pmm · Fm(ht+1),
where for m ≥ 2: P×m =Pr{Alice transmits successfully}
=2pm,t(1− pm,t)m−1,
Pm−1m =Pr{Exactly 1 player other than Alice transmits successfully}
=2(m− 1)pm,t
[
(1− pm,t)m−1 − (m− 1)pm,t(1− 2pm,t)m−2
]
,
Pm−2m =Pr{Exactly 2 players other than Alice transmit successfully}
=(m− 1)(m− 2)p2m,t(1− 2pm,t)m−2,
Pmm =Pr{No player transmits successfully} = 1− P×m − Pm−1m − Pm−2m .
4The probabilities are correct by defining 00 = 1.
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For m = 1 the pending player has probability of no transmission equal to zero, therefore
F1(ht) = 1 for every history ht.
Now, given that m ≥ 2 players are pending, the equilibrium protocol cannot assign to
them probability pm,t = 0 at any time t. That is because a unilateral deviator that surely
transmitted to a channel would be successful and therefore she would acquire strictly smaller
latency than any other player. Since transmission to both channels is in the support of the
decision rule of a player at time t, both sure transmission attempt to some channel and no
transmission should yield the same expected latency to a player. In the sequel we will use
the expected future latency Fm(ht) for our analysis. The expected future latency of Alice
when she surely transmits on an arbitrary channel in round t with m ≥ 2 pending players
(including herself) is
Fm(ht) = 1 +Q
m−1
m · Fm−1(ht+1) + (1−Q×m −Qm−1m ) · Fm(ht+1), (15)
where for m ≥ 3: Q×m =Pr{Alice transmits successfully}
=(1− pm,t)m−1,
Qm−1m =Pr{Exactly 1 player other than Alice transmits successfully}
=(m− 1)pm,t
[
(1− pm,t)m−2 − (1− 2pm,t)m−2
]
,
Qmm =Pr{No player transmits successfully} = 1−Q×m −Qm−1m ,
for m = 2: Q×2 =1− pm,t, Q12 = 0, Q22 = pm,t. (16)
The expected future latency of Alice when she surely does not attempt transmission in
round t with m ≥ 2 pending players (including herself) is
Fm(ht) = 1 + S
m−1
m · Fm−1(ht+1) + Sm−2m · Fm−2(ht+1) + (1− Sm−1m − Sm−2m ) · Fm(ht+1),
(17)
where for m ≥ 3: Sm−1m =Pr{Exactly 1 player other than Alice transmits successfully}
=2(m− 1)pm,t
[
(1− pm,t)m−2 − (m− 2)pm,t(1− 2pm,t)m−3
]
,
Sm−2m =Pr{Exactly 2 players other than Alice transmit successfully}
=(m− 1)(m− 2)p2m,t(1− 2pm,t)m−3,
Smm =Pr{No player transmits successfully} = 1− Sm−1m − Sm−2m ,
for m = 2: S12 =2pm,t, S
0
2 = 0, S
2
2 = 1− 2pm,t. (18)
By equating the right-hand sides of (15) and (17) we get the probability pm,t as a function
of expected future costs Fm−1(ht+1), Fm−2(ht+1) and Fm(ht+1).
The equilibrium probability that depends on the number of pending players m and defines
the equilibrium protocol, although guaranteed to exist when expected (future) latencies are
finite, is difficult to be expressed in closed form. Contrary to the case of a single channel
studied in [10], where pm,t can be nicely expressed as a function of Fm−1(ht+1) and Fm(ht+1)
in closed form, this does not seem to be the case in the current setting.
We should mention here that in the single-channel setting studied in [10] the decision
rule pm,t = 1 for m ≥ 3 is in equilibrium. However, in the case of two channels, a similar
result (e.g. pm,t = 1/2) for any number of pending players does not seem to hold. Indeed, in
time t with m ≥ 5 pending players playing pm,t = 1/2, the best response with strictly better
expected latency is pm,t = 0.
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4.2 History-independent FIN-EQ protocols
Let us now consider anonymous, history-independent protocols, that is, protocols whose
decision rules depend only on the number 1 ≤ m ≤ n of pending players. Now, the decision
rule pm of the players does not depend on their transmission history (and therefore on time
as well), hence a player’s expected future latency Fm does not depend on her transmission
history. In this class of protocols the following theorem fully characterizes the equilibria.
Theorem 6. There exists a unique, anonymous, history-independent, equilibrium protocol
with ternary feedback for n players and 2 transmission channels, which is: any player among
2 ≤ m ≤ n remaining players, for every t ≥ 1 attempts transmission to each channel with
equal probability pm. This probability is Θ(
1√
m
) and yields expected future latency eΘ(
√
m) for
every player.
Proof. By manipulating the equilibrium conditions (15) and (17) we find
Fm =
[
Qm−2m−1S
m−1
m + S
m−2
m (1−Qm−1m−1)
]−Qm−1m (Qm−2m−1 − Sm−2m )
(1−Qmm)
[
Qm−2m−1S
m−1
m + S
m−2
m (1−Qm−1m−1)
]−Qm−2m−1Qm−1m (1− Smm) . (19)
From this we can also get Fm−1, thus, replacing these two in relation (15), which, in the
history-independent case becomes
(1−Qmm)Fm = 1 +Qm−1m Fm−1, (20)
we get the recurrence relation for the transmission probability pm to each channel. The
resulting recurrence relation of pm is non-linear with non-constant coefficients and for its
form there is no methodology in the literature that solves it - to the authors’ knowledge.
However, we can find the asymptotic behaviour of pm in the following way.
First, we show by induction that pm is uniquely determined. The recurrence relation of
pm holds for m ≥ 2 since our probabilities Q and S are defined for this domain only. That
is because probabilities Q and S stem from the requirement that “transmission” and “no
transmission” are both in the support of the decision rule for a player, which is not true in
the case of m = 1. As a base case of our induction we use m = 2, for which we find from
(15) and (17) as unique solution the pair (p2 = 1/2, F2 = 2). Now consider some m ≥ 2
and assume that all pm′ are uniquely determined for every m
′, 2 ≤ m′ ≤ m, and thus all
Fm′ are uniquely determined by (19). Let us replace m with m+ 1 in (20), and fix pm and
Fm with the known ones. This gives us a rational univariate function - let us call it h - of
pm+1, i.e. h(pm+1) = (1−Qm+1m+1)Fm+1 − 1−Qmm+1Fm. We would like to find the roots of h
in the interval (0, 1/2]. By substituting Qm+1m+1, Q
m
m+1 and Fm from (16) and (19) respectively,
and then examining the first and second derivative of h, we can see that h(0) = 0, h has
its unique minimum for some p′m+1 ∈ (0, 1/2), and it is strictly decreasing in [0, p′m+1]. In
[p′m+1, 1/2] it is strictly increasing and h(1/2) ≥ 0. Therefore, in (0, 1/2] there is a unique
root p∗m+1 of h.
Now we proceed in showing that the asymptotic behaviour in both sides of the recurrence
relation (20) is the same for pm ∈ Θ(1/
√
m). First, we express the probabilities Q and S (see
sets of equations (16) and (18)) in terms of Q×m, and then we put pm,t = pm ∈ Θ(1/
√
m).
This gives:
Q×m ∈ e−Θ(
√
m), Qm−1m = Q
×
m · f1(m), Qm−2m = 0, Qmm = 1−Q×m · f2(m), and
S×m = 0, S
m−1
m = Q
×
m · g1(m), Sm−2m =
(
Q×m
)2 · g2(m), Smm = 1−Q×m · g3(m),
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where the functions f1(m), f2(m), g1(m), g3(m) are in Θ(
√
m) and g2(m) is in Θ(m). Now
that we have described the asymptotic behaviour of the probabilities Q and S, we can find the
asymptotic behaviour of the expected future latency Fm using (19). By carefully simplifying
the numerator and denominator in the right-hand side of (19) we get
Fm =
1
Q×m · h1(m)
, where h1(m) ∈ Θ(
√
m).
Recall that Q×m ∈ e−Θ(
√
m), thus Fm ∈ eΘ(
√
m). The above formula for Fm also implies that
Fm−1 = 1/
(
Q×m−1 · h2(m)
)
, where h2(m) ∈ Θ(
√
m). By substituting Fm and Fm−1 in the
recurrence relation (20), we show that the asymptotic behaviour in both sides of it are the
same, in particular, Θ(1). This completes the proof.
The latter result is analogous to the one in [10] that characterizes anonymous, history-
independent, equilibrium protocols with ternary feedback for the case of a single channel.
However here, the proof methodology is a bit more involved due to the fact that the
transmission probabilities in equilibrium cannot be expressed in closed-form, therefore their
asymptotic behaviour can only be extracted from a recurrence relation, which, contrary to
the one in [10], is quite complex. Using dynamic programming, we compute the equilibrium
probabilities for up to m = 100 which are presented in Figure 1.
Fig. 1. Blue: the equilibrium probabilities pm for 2 ≤ m ≤ 100. Red: experimental upper bound, function
2√
m−1 . Black: experimental lower bound, function
1
2
√
m−1 .
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5 IN-EQ Protocols for Both Feedback Classes
In this section we give IN-EQ protocols within the classes of acknowledgement-based and
ternary feedback for the general case of k ≥ 1 channels and any number of n ≥ 2k+ 1 players.
For this, we employ the deadline idea introduced in [10] and consequently used in [7,8]. Our
protocols have the property that the time until all players transmit successfully is Θ(n/k)
with high probability, even though the expected time until all players transmit successfully
is infinite.
5.1 Acknowledgemnt-based feedback
An efficient deadline protocol with channel assignment at t = Θ(n/k). Consider
k ≥ 1 transmission channels, n ≥ 2k+ 1 players, a fixed constant β ∈ (0, 1) and a deadline t0
to be determined consequently. The t0 − 1 time steps are partitioned into r + 1 consecutive
intervals I1, I2, . . . , Ir+1 where r is the unique integer in
[− logβ n/2− 1,− logβ n/2]. For
any j ∈ {1, 2, . . . , r + 1} define nj = βjn/k. For j ∈ {1, 2, . . . , r} the length of interval Ij
is lj = b eβnjc. Interval Ir+1 is special and has length lr+1 = n/k. We define the following
anonymous protocol.
Protocol g1:
Every player among 1 ≤ m ≤ n pending players for t ∈ Ij assigns transmission
probability 1/max{nj , k} to each channel. Right before the deadline
t0 = 1 +
∑r+1
j=1 lj each pending player is assigned to a random channel equiprobably,
and for t ≥ t0 always attempts transmission to that channel.
Lemma 4. Protocol g1 for n ≥ 2k+ 1 players and k ≥ 1 channels, is an equilibrium protocol
and it is also efficient.
Proof. First we prove that g1 is an equilibrium protocol when n ≥ 2k + 1. Consider an
arbitrary player i, and observe that since all players play g1 the probability that all of them
will be still pending by t0 is 1/n
t0 > 0. Given that, the probability that player i at t0 will be
assigned to the same channel with at least 2 other players is at least the probability that
she will be assigned to the same channel with all other players, which is at least 1/kn > 0.
Hence, the probability that player i can find herself in t = t0 pending together with two other
players is positive, and in this case she will remain pending forever. Therefore, i’s expected
latency is ∞, and since by any unilateral deviation of i she cannot make the aforementioned
event empty, her expected latency will always be ∞. Therefore, g1 is an equilibrium protocol.
Now we proceed by showing that g1 is also efficient. The proof of efficiency is essentially
the same as that of Theorem 11 in [7]. The difference here is that we have tuned nj and lr+1
according to our problem and we have used variable r instead of k. As a consequence, this
result is the same as the aforementioned theorem, except that ours has n/k instead of n.
5.2 Ternary feedback
Since in the ternary feedback setting the only history-independent equilibrium from Subsection
4.2 yields exponential expected latency in the number of players n, even one player’s latency
being any polynomial in n happens with exponentially small probability. This fact points
to history-dependent protocols as candidates for efficient equilibria. Here, we construct
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a protocol which imposes a heavy cost on any player that does not manage to transmit
successfully until a certain deadline-round. This forces any potential deviator to play “fairly”
until the deadline and follow an efficient protocol that guarantees socially optimal latency
(time Θ(n/k) for all players to pass) with high probability.
As a first step, we give the general Lemma 5 that determines the expected number of
successful transmissions in a round where m players have a uniform distribution on the
channels, and subsequently in Fact 1 we find the maximum of that expected number. Then,
we present another lemma (Lemma 5.A) that gives an upper bound on the expected finishing
time when m ≤ k. Finally, using all the aforementioned intermediate results, we present a
socially optimal protocol in Lemma 6 which is employed in the proof for our IN-EQ protocol
(Theorem 7).
Lemma 5. Consider a single round with k ≥ 1 channels and n ≥ 1 players. Assume that for
every player the probability of transmission attempt is z ∈ [0, 1] which she splits equally to all
k channels. Then, the expected number5 of players that transmit successfully is zn
(
1− zk
)n−1
.
Proof. For a fixed z ∈ [0, 1], denote by Xn the random variable that indicates how many
players transmit successfully in a round with n players. Note that when z = 1 and n ≥ 2,
the case where Xn = n − 1 is impossible since in order for some player to have a failed
transmission she has to be blocked by someone else.
Our problem reduces to the following balls-and-bins problem: Consider n balls and k
bins, where n ≥ 1. Each ball is thrown with probability z/k to each bin, and not thrown at
all with probability 1− z. Random variable Xn ∈ {0, 1, 2, . . . , n} now indicates the number
of bins that had a single ball after the experiment.
We want to find E[Xn]. For this, we will employ the probability of the event that x bins
contain a single ball given that the round started with n balls. Denote by Aj the event that
bin j contains a single ball. Also, we define the probabilities of intersections between such
events
pj = Pr(Aj), pjm = Pr(Aj ∩Am), pjml = Pr(Aj ∩Am ∩Al), . . .
and we write Sr to denote the sums of all distinct p’s with r subscripts. That is
S1 =
k∑
j=1
pj , S2 =
∑
j<m
pjm, S3 =
∑
j<m<l
pjml, . . .
where the subscripts are in increasing order j < m < l < · · · < k for uniqueness, so that in
the sums each combination appears only once; therefore Sr has
(
k
r
)
terms. In our setting,
each term of Sr equals (
n
r
)
r!
(z
k
)r (
1− rz
k
)n−r
since for specific r bins to contain a single ball there are
(
n
r
)
combinations of r balls, which
should occupy the r bins with r! orders. Each of those chosen r balls can fall in a bin with
probability zk and each of the rest n− r balls has to fall in some other than those r bins or
not be thrown at all, which happens with probability 1− rzk . So,
Sr =
(
k
r
)(
n
r
)
r!
(z
k
)r (
1− rz
k
)n−r
5We define 00 = 1.
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and by the Inclusion-Exclusion Theorem, the probability that exactly x bins contain a single
ball is the following6
Pn(x) =
n∑
r=x
(−1)r−x
(
r
x
)
Sr
=
n∑
r=x
(−1)r−x
(
r
x
)(
k
r
)(
n
r
)
r!
(z
k
)r (
1− rz
k
)n−r
(21)
We want to calculate E[Xn]. We have
E[Xn] =
n∑
x=0
xPn(x)
=
n∑
x=0
n∑
r=x
(−1)r−xx
(
r
x
)(
k
r
)(
n
r
)
r!
(z
k
)r (
1− rz
k
)n−r
=
n∑
r=0
r∑
x=0
(−1)r−xx
(
r
x
)(
k
r
)(
n
r
)
r!
(z
k
)r (
1− rz
k
)n−r
=
n∑
r=0
(
k
r
)(
n
r
)
r!
(z
k
)r (
1− rz
k
)n−r r∑
x=0
(−1)r−xx
(
r
x
)
=
n∑
r=0
(
k
r
)(
n
r
)
r!
(z
k
)r (
1− rz
k
)n−r
(−1)r
r∑
x=0
(−1)xx
(
r
x
)
=
(
k
1
)(
n
1
)
z
k
(
1− z
k
)n−1
(−1)(−1) (since
r∑
x=0
(−1)xx
(
r
x
)
= −1 for r = 1, 0 otherwise)
= zn
(
1− z
k
)n−1
.
Fact 1. Consider the function f(z) = zn(1− z/k)n−1, with domain [0, 1] and parameters
k ≥ 1, and n ≥ 1. The maximum of f is attained for z = min{k/n, 1}.
Proof. The first and second derivatives of f are
f ′(n) = n
(
1− zn
k
)(
1− z
k
)n−2
f ′′(n) = n(n− 1)
(
1− z
k
)n−3 nz − 2k
k2
When n < k, then f ′(z) > 0 and therefore the global maximum of f is attained for z = 1,
which gives f(1) = n(1− 1/k)n−1.
When n ≥ k, the first derivative of f is 0 for (a) z = k when n ≥ 3, or (b) z = k/n when
n ≥ 1. Case (a) only works if k = 1 due to the domain of z and gives f(1) = 0. f ′(z) is
positive in [0, k/n), and negative in (k/n, 1). Therefore, f(k/n) = k(1− 1/n)n−1 is the global
maximum.
6For the case where a < b we define
(
a
b
)
, 0 so that the analysis is displayed only once for both cases
n ≤ k and n > k.
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Lemma 5.A. Suppose there are k ≥ 2 channels and 2 ≤ n ≤ k players and suppose that
all players use the following protocol: A player in every time step t ≥ 1 has a probability
of transmission 1/k to every channel. Then, the expected time until everyone transmits
successfully is upper bounded by 11−ln(e−1) ln(
n
2 ) +
(
1− 1k
)−1
.
Proof. Denote by Xm the random variable that indicates how many players transmit success-
fully in a round t where m ∈ {0, 2, . . . , n} players are left. Note that the case where m = 1 is
impossible since in order for some player to have a failed transmission she has to be blocked
by someone else. In the next round the expected number of players will be m− E[Xm]. We
define the finishing time as the following random variable T , inf{t : m = 0} and we would
like to find its expectation.
Our problem reduces to the following balls and bins problem: Consider n balls and k
bins, where 2 ≤ n ≤ k. At time t = 1 all balls are thrown uniformly at random to the k
bins. For all the bins that contain a single ball, these balls are removed, and in the next
round m ∈ {0, 2, . . . , n} balls remain. At time t = 2 all m balls are thrown uniformly at
random to the k bins. The process continues as long as there are remaining balls. Random
variable Xm ∈ {0, 1, 2, . . . ,m} now indicates the number of bins that had a single ball when
the respective round started with m balls. Note again that Pr(Xm = m− 1)= 0 since there
is no allocation of balls in the bins such that m− 1 bins have a single ball. Random variable
T , inf{t : m = 0} is the finishing time of this process.
We define the function f(m) to be the expected finishing time E[T ] when m players
remain. We assume that this function is non-decreasing and concave. Then we have,
f(m) = 1 +
m∑
i=0
Pr(Xm = i)f(m−Xm)
= 1 + E[f(m−Xm)]
≤ 1 + f (E[m−Xm]) (concavity of f and Jensen’s inequality)
= 1 + f(m− E[Xm]) (linearity of expectation) (22)
Now by exploiting the monotonicity of the function f(m) in equation (22), and using
Lemma 5 we only need to find a lower bound on E[Xm]. This is easy, since m
(
1− 1k
)m−1 ≥
m
(
1− 1k
)k−1 ≥ m/e. Then from equation (22) we get
f(m) ≤ 1 + f
(
m
(
1− 1
e
))
≤ r + f
(
m
(
1− 1
e
)r)
.
We use as base case f(2) for which holds that f(2) = 1 + k 1
k2
f(2), or equivalently, f(2) =
(1− 1/k)−1. Then the r for which m (1− 1e)r = 2 finally gives us
f(m) ≤ 1
1− ln(e− 1) ln(
m
2
) +
(
1− 1
k
)−1
We define the following anonymous, history-independent protocol which we prove to
be efficient. However, we remark that it is not in equilibrium, due to Theorem 6 which
characterizes the unique, anonymous, equilibrium protocol that is history-independent.
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Protocol SOP:
Every player among 1 ≤ m ≤ n pending players, in each round t ≥ 1 assigns
transmission probability 1/max{m, k} to each channel.
Lemma 6. Protocol SOP for k ≥ 1 channels and n > k players has expected finishing time
O((n− k)/k).
Proof. Suppose protocol SOP as stated in the theorem is used. Then, the transmission
probability of each player in each round is uniform on the set of channels K. Using the
framework of Lemma 5, according to protocol SOP for variable z we have z = min{k/m, 1},
and we know from Fact 1 that this value maximizes the number of successful transmissions in
a round with m players. Denote by Xm the random variable that keeps track of the number
of successful transmissions in a single round with m > k pending players. Then, according to
Lemma 5, in a round with m > k pending players it is E[Xm] = k(1− 1/m)m−1.
Define the function f(m) to be the expected finishing time when there are m > k pending
players. We assume that this function is non-decreasing and concave. Then we have
f(m) = 1 +
m∑
i=0
Pr(Xm = i)f(m−Xm)
= 1 + E[f(m−Xm)]
≤ 1 + f (E[m−Xm]) (concavity of f and Jensen’s inequality)
= 1 + f(m− E[Xm]) (linearity of expectation) (23)
Now by exploiting the monotonicity of the function f(m) in equation (23), and using
Lemma 5 we only need to find a lower bound on E[Xm]. This is easy, since k
(
1− 1m
)m−1 ≥ k/e.
Then from equation (23) we get
f(m) ≤ 1 + f
(
m− k
e
)
≤ r + f
(
m− rk
e
)
.
We use as base case f(k) for which holds that f(k) ≤ 11−ln(e−1) ln(k2 ) +
(
1− 1k
)−1
, due to
Lemma 5.A. Then the r for which m− r ke = k finally gives us
f(m) ≤ em− k
k
+
1
1− ln(e− 1) ln(
k
2
) +
(
1− 1
k
)−1
.
Lemma 7. (a) If at t = 0 there are n pending players, the probability that more than k
players are pending at time t1 = 2e(n− k)/k is at most exp
(−n−k2ek ).
(b) If at t = 0 there are k pending players, the probability that not all players have transmitted
successfully at time t2 = 2e(n− k)/k is at most exp
(−n−k2ek ).
Proof. Let {Yt}t1t=1 be random variables which indicate the number of successful transmissions
that occur in each time-step from t = 1 up to t1 , 2e(n−k)/k, given that there are n pending
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players at time t = 0. For the events for which Y ,
∑t1
t=1 Yt > n − k we have the desired
outcome. For the rest, since the pending players in each round 1 ≤ t ≤ t1 are m > k, the
protocol prescribes to each player probability 1/m on each channel. Therefore, by Lemma 5,
we have E[Yt] = k (1− 1/m)m−1. In the next claim we show that Yt stochastically dominates
a random variable Zt ∈ {0, 1, . . . , k} that indicates the number of successful transmissions in
round 1 ≤ t ≤ t1 but, in this process, the players that transmit successfully are placed back
to the group of pending players.
Claim. Pr{Yt ≥ x} ≥ Pr{Zt ≥ x}, for all x ∈ {0, 1, · · · , k}.
Proof. We will prove the above claim by showing the stronger fact that, for any fixed number
1 ≤ m ≤ n− 1 of pending players at time t,
Pr{Yt ≥ x | m pending players} ≥ Pr{Yt ≥ x | m+ 1 pending players}, for all x ∈ {0, 1, · · · , k}.
Indeed, by substituting the probabilities of the above inequality we get,(
m
x
)
x!
(
1
m
)x (
1− x
m
)m−x ≥ (m+ 1
x
)
x!
(
1
m+ 1
)x(
1− x
m+ 1
)m+1−x
,
or equivalently, (m+ 1)m(m− x)m−x ≥ mm(m− x+ 1)m−x,
and finally,
(
1 +
1
m
)m
≥
(
1 +
1
m− x
)m−x
,
which is true, since the function f(w) = (1 + 1/w)w is strictly increasing. The claim follows
from the fact that for any fixed x ∈ {0, 1, · · · , k},
Pr{Zt ≥ x} = Pr{Yt ≥ x | n pending players}.
Clearly {Zt}t1t=1 are independent random variables bounded in [0, k]. Let Z ,
∑t1
t=1 Zt and
µ1 , E[Z] =
∑t1
t=1 E[Zt] = t1k (1− 1/n)n−1. Then by a Chernoff bound and the stochastic
domination we have,
Pr(Y ≤ n− k) ≤ Pr(Z ≤ n− k) = Pr
(
Z ≤ µ1
2e (1− 1/n)n−1
)
≤ Pr
(
Z ≤ µ1
2
)
≤ exp
(
−(1− 1/2)
2µ21
t1(k − 0)2
)
≤ exp
(
−1
4
t1
e2
)
= exp
(
−n− k
2ek
)
,
where in the last three inequalities we used the fact that (1− 1/n)n−1 ≥ 1/e.
For the second part of the proof, suppose the process is at round t = 0 with k pending
players. Let {Xt}t2t=1 be random variables which indicate the number of successful transmis-
sions that occur in each time-step from t = 1 up to t2 , 2e(n− k)/k, given that there are
k pending players at time t = 0. The pending players in each round 1 ≤ t ≤ t2 are m ≤ k,
hence the protocol prescribes to each player probability 1/k on each channel. By Lemma 5,
we have E[Xt] = m (1− 1/k)m−1. Now, observe that Xt stochastically dominates a random
variable Wt ∈ {0, 1, . . . , k} that indicates the number of successful transmissions in round
1 ≤ t ≤ t2 but, in this process, the players that transmit successfully are placed back to the
group of pending players. The latter observation is easy to see since an argument similar to
the Claim that was stated earlier holds in this case.
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Clearly, {Wt}t2t=1 are independent random variables bounded in [0, k]. Let W ,
∑t2
t=1Wt
and µ2 , E[W ] =
∑t2
t=1 E[Wt] = t2k (1− 1/k)k−1. Then by a Chernoff bound and the
stochastic domination we have,
Pr(X ≤ k − 1) ≤ Pr(W ≤ k) = Pr
(
W ≤ µ2k
2e(n− k) (1− 1/k)k−1
)
≤ Pr
(
W ≤ µ2
2
)
≤ exp
(
−(1− 1/2)
2µ22
t2(k − 0)2
)
≤ exp
(
−1
4
t2
e2
)
= exp
(
−n− k
2ek
)
,
where in the last three inequalities we used the fact that (1− 1/k)k−1 ≥ 1/e, and n ≥ 2k+ 1.
This completes the proof of the lemma.
We define the following anonymous protocol. In the next theorem we show that it is an
equilibrium protocol and also that it is efficient.
Protocol g2:
Let the deadline be t0 = 4e(n− k)/k. Every player among 1 ≤ m ≤ n pending
players for 1 ≤ t ≤ t0 − 1 assigns transmission probability 1/max{m, k} to each
channel. Right before t0 each pending player is assigned to a random channel
equiprobably, and for t ≥ t0 always attempts transmission to that channel.
Theorem 7. Protocol g2 for n ≥ 2k + 1 players and k ≥ 1 channels is an equilibrium
protocol, and for n ∈ ω(k) it is also efficient.
Proof. First, we show that it is an equilibrium protocol when n ≥ 2k + 1. The expected
latency of a player using the aforementioned protocol g2 is ∞. That is because there is an
event with positive probability in which some player i finds herself in an equilibrium where at
least 2 of the other players have been assigned to each and all of the k channels and transmit
there in every time slot. In particular, with probability at least k( 1n)
t0−1 > 0 all players will
be pending right after t0 − 1. Given this, with probability
(
n−1
2,2,...,2,n−1−2k
)
( 1k )
n−1 > 0 exactly
2 out of n − 1 players will be assigned to each of the k − 1 channels and the remaining
players (including player i), which are at least 3, are assigned to the remaining channel.
Therefore, the aforementioned two events occur with positive probability, and then for player
i all channels are blocked for every t ≥ t0, resulting to infinite latency. Hence, the expected
latency of a player using protocol g2 is ∞.
Now suppose that player i unilaterally deviates to some protocol g′2. The event that
all players are pending right before t0 remains non-empty, since the event that all players
transmit on the same channel as i for every 1 ≤ t ≤ t0 − 1 happens with positive probability.
Given that, the event that at least 2 of the players other than i will be assigned to each
channel happens with positive probability. Therefore, the deviator’s expected latency remains
∞ and g2 is an equilibrium protocol.
Now we will show that, when n ∈ ω(k), this protocol is also efficient, i.e. the time until
all n players transmit successfully is linear in n/k with high probability. By Lemma 7, the
probability that not all players have successfully transmitted by time t1 + t2 = 4e(n− k)/k
is at most
exp
(
−n− k
2ek
)
+ exp
(
−n− k
2ek
)
= 2exp
(
−n− k
2ek
)
.
Therefore, when n ∈ ω(k), no player is pending after 4e(n−k)/k rounds with high probability.
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6 Open Problems
This work leaves open some interesting problems. One of them is to find equilibria for
arbitrary number of players in the multiple-channel setting with acknowledgement-based
feedback. This will probably require a characterization of equilibria such as the one we
provide for ternary feedback protocols in Subsection 4.1.
Another important open problem is to prove or disprove that there exists a FIN-EQ
protocol that is efficient in the multiple-channels setting. This could be a deadline protocol
or it might use some other key idea to impose a heavy latency on the players as a threat, so
that they auto-restrain themselves from frequently attempting transmission. Proving that
there is no efficient deadline FIN-EQ for the multiple-channel setting would be an interesting
“paradox”, since an efficient deadline FIN-EQ is found in [10] for the single-channel setting
with ternary feedback. We conjecture that such a protocol does not exist.
Acknowledgements. We would like to thank Frans Oliehoek for useful discussions on
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